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Tracey L. Mearest 
INTRODUCTION 
Community policing is central to any conversation about the role of 
community in law and criminal justice. The term has become ubiquitous 
among law-enforcement practitioners and scholars.' Many police depart- 
ments have integrated or are in the process of integrating some form of 
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1. See THE CHALLENGE OF COMMUNITY POLICING: TESTING THE PROMISES xi (Dennis P. 
Rosenbaum ed., 1994) [hereinafter CHALLENGE OF COMMUNITY POLICING] ("In fact, community 
policing has become so attractive that nearly every politician and police chief today wants to jump on 
the bandwagon."); WESLEY G. SKOGAN & SUSAN M. HARTNETT, COMMUNITY POLICING, CHICAGO 
STYLE vi (1997) ("The concept is so popular with the public and city councils that scarcely a chief 
wants his department to be known for failing to climb on this bandwagon."); William J. Bratton, 
Community Policing, Bratton Style, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1994, at A16 ("Community policing is the 
most promising trend in urban law enforcement. ... President Clinton lauded the idea in his State of the 
Union address, using New York City's program as a prime example."); John E. Eck & Dennis 
Rosenbaum, The New Police Order. Effectiveness, Equity, and Efficiency in Community Policing, in 
CHALLENGE OF COMMUNITY POLICING, supra, at 3 ("Community policing has become the new 
orthodoxy for cops.... In both theory and practice, the dominance of the community policing 
movement is evident."); Edward D. Maguire & Stephen D. Mastrofski, Patterns of Community Policing 
in the United States, 3 POLICE Q. 4, 4 (2000) ("Community policing has become a household phrase. 
Police agencies around the nation report that they are turning toward community policing.... Even 
agencies generally claiming not to practice community policing tend to engage in some of its specific 
activities."); Mark H. Moore, Research Synthesis and Policy Implications, in CHALLENGE OF 
COMMUNITY POLICING, supra, at 285 ("Something is clearly afoot in the field of policing.... Indeed, 
popular enthusiasm for these ideas is so great that in a few cases in which police executives have been 
slow to embrace them, communities have forced the ideas upon them."); Albert J. Reiss, Jr., Police 
Organization in the Twentieth Century, 15 CRIME & JUST. 51, 91 ("As the twentieth century draws to a 
close, the twin ideologies of community-based and problem-oriented policing are reshaping at least the 
way some police organizations do their business."). 
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community policing into their enforcement strategies.2 Consequently, much 
debate has sparked over whether community policing is superior to more 
traditional, reactive law-enforcement techniques.3 
Although this debate over community policing is critical, this Essay 
explores a different issue, one not frequently addressed in the scholarship 
on the subject. I focus on what police themselves think about community 
policing. One might think that if certain forms of police action have both 
community support and an impact on crime, the police would be eager to 
adopt such practices. But what if they are not? I will explore this question 
here. 
To address the question, I will examine survey data collected from 
police officers in Chicago's highest-crime police district. The officers were 
surveyed after the Eleventh District's police were involved in facilitating a 
community-wide prayer vigil-an undoubtedly atypical practice that, none- 
theless, might properly be categorized as community policing. All of the 
police officers in the district were surveyed. Over half of the surveyed offi- 
cers agreed that it was good for the Chicago Police Department ("CPD") to 
2. See MATTHEW J. HICKMAN & BRIAN A. REAVES, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIAL 
REPORT (FEB. 2001): COMMUNITY POLICING IN LOCAL POLICE DEPARTMENTS, 1997 AND 1999. 
3. For evaluations of community policing, see, for example, SKOGAN & HARTNETT, ch.7 (1997) 
(comparing changes in prototype Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy ("CAPS") districts to changes 
in non-CAPS districts, and concluding that CAPS districts generally performed better in terms of 
citizens' perceptions and actual crime measures); Jack R. Greene & Ralph B. Taylor, Community- 
Based Policing and Foot Patrol: Issues of Theory and Evaluation, in COMMUNITY 
POLICING: RHETORIC OR REALITY 103 (Jack R. Greene & Stephen Mastrofski eds., 1988) [hereinafter 
COMMUNITY POLICING: RHETORIC OR REALITY] (noting lack of consensus in existing studies of 
community policing, and suggesting the existence of several theoretical and empirical deficiencies to 
account for the inconsistencies); Arthur J. Lurigio & Dennis P. Rosenbaum, The Impact of Community 
Policing on Police Personnel: A Review of the Literature, in CHALLENGE OF COMMUNITY POLICING, 
supra note 1, at 147 (reviewing twelve studies of community policing and concluding that, "[o]n 
balance, these studies have shown that community policing has exerted a positive impact on the police 
and on citizens' views of the police"); Dennis P. Rosenbaum et al., Impact of Community Policing on 
Police Personnel: A Quasi-Experimental Test, 40 CRIME & DELINQ. 331 (1994) (concluding that 
despite some gains in knowledge of community policing, frequency of foot patrol, and frequency or 
informal contact with citizens, "the absence of change was the norm rather than the exception"); 
Wesley G. Skogan, The Impact of Community Policing on Neighborhood Residents: A Cross-Site 
Analysis, in CHALLENGE OF COMMUNITY POLICING, supra note 1, at 147 (reviewing studies from six 
cities on the effect of community policing on fear of crime, disorder, victimization, police service, and 
drug availability, and concluding that the results are mixed); Mary Ann Wycoff, The Benefits of 
Community Policing: Evidence and Conjecture, in COMMUNITY POLICING: RHETORIC OR REALITY, 
supra, at 103 (describing empirical results finding that the implementation of community-oriented 
policing strategies led to reduced fear and improved attitudes toward police among citizens, and 
suggesting that those same strategies lead to positive effects for officers as well); Mary Ann Wycoff 
and Wesley G. Skogan, Community Policing in Madison: An Analysis of Implementation and Impact, 
in CHALLENGE OF COMMUNITY POLICING, supra note 1, at 75 (concluding that implementation of 
community policing had positive effects for both police officers and citizens). Note, of course, that a 
debate proceeding along the lines that I have just described presumes that one really knows exactly how 
to define the term "community policing." See infra text accompanying notes 8-39. Moreover, such a 
debate presumes that there is some kind of agreement about the yardsticks one should use in order to 
evaluate in what ways community policing is better than traditional policing. 
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be involved in organizing community events like the prayer vigil.4 A great 
many of them agreed with statements consistent with the conclusion that 
the collaboration between area churches and police that resulted in the 
prayer vigil is good for the community and makes the officers feel better 
about their jobs. 
Yet the data also reveal a paradox. Many of the officers who agreed 
with statements in support of activities like the prayer vigil and who agreed 
that the prayer vigil made them feel better about the prospects for the 
community also agreed that police interested in prayer vigils ought to 
engage in such activities on their own time. This paradox has interesting 
public-policy implications, especially for policies that emphasize greater 
integration of law-enforcement officers, who are state representatives, into 
the communities in which ordinary citizens reside. I call the opinions of 
these officers paradoxical because, as I explain below, police officers 
committed to the ideals of community policing typically are expected to 
(and believe they should) take on community goals and projects as their 
own when such projects are consistent with crime prevention. Therefore, it 
is hardly surprising when community police officers who thought it was 
good for the CPD to organize the prayer vigil and who thought that the 
prayer vigil was good for the community also thought that officers ought to 
engage in activities like the prayer vigil on official time. Explaining the 
opinions of officers who both supported the prayer vigil and who thought it 
was good for the community but who nonetheless disagreed that commu- 
nity police officers ought to be involved is more of a puzzle. 
Residents of all communities desire safety. Those who reside in high- 
crime urban communities-many of whom are poor and minority-likely 
make safety an even higher priority.5 One aspect of community policing on 
which there is widespread agreement is that community policing is de- 
signed (or should be) to help make law-enforcement priorities more consis- 
tent with the desires of community residents.6 The question then becomes 
how to realize this goal. Critics of community policing fear that encourag- 
ing the alignment of law enforcement and community interests will result 
in the compromise of individual rights-usually criminal-procedural rights. 
4. See infra note 136. 
5. When asked, "Are we spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on halting the 
rising crime rate?" 71.4% of Blacks with incomes less than $25,000 answered, "too little" in 2000, 
compared to 57.7% of Whites with incomes greater than $25,000. See 2000 General Social Survey, 
Question 66, at http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/GSS/. To generate this statistic, use the site's 
crosstabulation function. Enter "NATCRIME" as the required variable (row), "race" and "income" as 
the optional variables (column and control), and "year(2000)" as the section filter. Poor Blacks are 
substantially more likely to live in high-crime urban areas of concentrated poverty than are Whites, 
including poor Whites. See Robert J. Sampson & William Julius Wilson, Toward a Theory of Race, 
Crime, and Urban Inequality, in CRIME AND INEQUALITY 41, 43 (John Hagan & Ruth D. Peterson Eds., 
1995). 
6. See infra text accompanying notes 37-38. 
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Yet, at the same time, scholars also recognize that the process of aligning 
the interests of those in high-crime urban neighborhoods with the goals of 
law enforcement might well enable residents of high-crime communities to 
hold law enforcers accountable in order to better guide their exercise of 
discretion. It is reasonable to expect this kind of guidance to limit the vio- 
lation of constitutional rights.7 
This Essay explains that the west-side community ("WSC") prayer 
vigil can be considered a community-policing practice that could poten- 
tially help residents of the community to resist crime. Part I of this Essay 
briefly describes various police practices that are referred to as community 
policing. It then provides a short account of the prevalence and origins of 
these models. Part II offers a community-based explanation of crime 
through sociological theory in order to provide at least one robust explana- 
tion of how certain kinds of police practices could support community ef- 
forts to resist crime. Part III describes an example of such a police 
practice-the WSC prayer vigil. It also specifically explains how collabo- 
ration between the police and many church leaders from the WSC could 
lead to the enhancement of the capacity of the participating neighborhoods 
to resist crime. Part IV then turns to the opinions of the police officers 
about the prayer vigil. First, it analyzes responses by police officers to a 
survey about this collaboration. Next, the analysis focuses on the paradox 
in the survey responses revealed above. Last, Part IV offers explanations 
for this paradox and discusses their implications for community-policing 
policy. 
I 
THE INCREASING PREVALENCE OF COMMUNITY POLICING 
In his State of the Union Address on January 25, 1994, President 
Clinton pledged to put 100,000 additional police officers on America's 
streets.8 Nine months later, on October 9, 1994, Attorney General Janet 
Reno formally opened the United States Department of Justice's Office of 
Community Oriented Policing Services ("COPS") to administer the police- 
hiring grants program and to expand community-policing programs.9 
The COPS Office was established to serve four goals: (1) to increase the 
number of community-policing officers by 100,000; (2) to promote 
7. See Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, The Coming Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 86 GEO. 
L.J. 1153, 1182-83 (1998) (explaining that political accountability of law enforcers to community 
members can enhance the ability of community members to guide law-enforcement officers' exercise 
of discretion in order to achieve the appropriate balance between liberty and order). 
8. See William J. Clinton, State of the Union, Address Before A Joint Session of Congress (Jan. 
24, 1994), in 30 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 148, 155-56. 
9. See OFFICE OF CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NEWS AND 
INFORMATION: COPS TIMELINE, at http://www.usdoj.gov/cops/news info/bg_info/bgtimeline.htm 
(last visited Feb. 15, 2002). 
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community policing in the United States; (3) to help local police agencies 
develop management infrastructure that could support and sustain commu- 
nity policing after federal funding ended; and (4) to demonstrate that 
community-policing techniques could significantly reduce violence, crime, 
and disorder in communities.10 Although the literature on policing had in- 
dicated since the late eighties that community policing had become an 
increasingly prevalent law-enforcement strategy, the opening of the COPS 
office undeniably signaled that community policing had arrived in 
American law enforcement." 
By all indications, a great deal of community policing is being im- 
plemented in the United States today. A Bureau of Justice Statistics 
("BJS") report recently estimated that state and local law-enforcement 
agencies employed nearly 113,000 community-policing officers or their 
equivalents during 1999.12 In contrast, in 1997, the number of community- 
policing officers or their equivalents was only 21,000.~3 To put these num- 
bers in perspective, the report indicates that in June of 1999, local police 
departments employed just over 436,000 full-time sworn officers.14 The 
BJS report also states that 64% of local police departments serving 85% of 
all residents had full-time offices engaged in community-policing activities 
in 1999, which means that community-policing officers are not concen- 
trated in just a few locales." 
These statistics suggest the increasing prevalence of community polic- 
ing. Moreover, they suggest that the burgeoning community-policing 
movement is widespread. However, there are at least two problems 
with these data. First, other than asserting that officers are engaged in 
"community policing," the BJS report provides no information about what 
these community-policing officers are doing, how much they are doing, 
and where they are doing it. Second, because no information about com- 
munity-policing activities is provided in the report, it is impossible to de- 
termine whether the community-policing officers counted in the report are 
engaged in activities that policing scholars and practitioners would con- 
sider community policing. In other words, the officers counted in the report 
10. See OFFICE OF CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, COPS OFFICE 
REPORT: 100,000 OFFICERS AND COMMUNITY POLICING ACROSS THE NATION 3 (1997). 
11. See, e.g., MALCOLM K. SPARROW ET AL., BEYOND 911: A NEW ERA FOR POLICING ch. 1 
(1990); Michael J. Farrell, The Development of the Community Patrol Officer Program: Community- 
Oriented Policing in the New York City Police Department, in COMMUNITY POLICING: RHETORIC OR 
REALITY, supra note 3, at 73; Mark H. Moore, Problem-Solving and Community Policing, in 15 CRIME 
& JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 99 (Michael Tonry & Norval Morris eds., 1992); Timothy 
Oettmeier & Lee Brown, Developing a Neighborhood-Oriented Policing Style, in COMMUNITY 
POLICING: RHETORIC OR REALITY, supra note 3, at 121. 
12. HICKMAN & REAVES, supra note 2, at 1. 
13. Id. at 1. 
14. Id. at 2. 
15. Id. at 2. 
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are community-policing officers only because those who responded to the 
survey designated them as such.16 Obviously, attempts to assess the scale 
and scope of community policing through such methods make it very diffi- 
cult to develop more concrete definitions of the practice.17 
To address the first problem with the BJS report, policing scholars 
Stephen Mastrofski and Edward Maguire have examined surveys of police 
organizations by the Police Foundation and the COPS Office in order to 
catalog specific policing practices and to determine whether there is a con- 
sensus in law-enforcement practice about what constitutes community po- 
licing.18 Although there is a great deal of variation in the definitions of 
community policing offered by scholars, most scholars agree that one cen- 
tral feature is police engagement, collaboration, or partnership with private 
citizens.19 Therefore, one might expect the survey responses to feature op- 
portunities for police and citizens to interact and work together, such as 
community beat meetings, as opposed to activities emphasizing police iso- 
lation from citizens, such as squad-car patrols. However, Mastrofski and 
Maguire's research reveals wide variations in the extent to which policing 
organizations participate in collaborative opportunities for police and citi- 
zens. 
Consider Mastrofski and Maguire's summary of the 1993 Police 
Foundation Survey, the most detailed of the four surveys they reviewed.20 
While approximately 60% of organizations reported meeting regularly with 
community groups, only 13.7% of surveyed organizations reported includ- 
ing citizens in the development of policing policies.21 Comparing the 
COPS surveys to the Police Foundation survey leads to more questions. All 
of the surveys asked police organizations to report whether they regularly 
met with citizens. As previously noted, 60% of the Police Foundation sur- 
vey respondents reported engaging in this activity. Yet, one COPS survey 
assessing policing activity in small towns reported that 40% of organiza- 
tions regularly met with community groups to discuss crime.22 A different 
COPS survey directed at larger towns reported a rate of approximately 
16. See Edward R. Maguire et al., Patterns of Community Policing in Nonurban America, 34 J. 
RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 368, 377 n.6 (1997) (explaining that no attempt was made to validate responses 
to community-policing checklists). 
17. David H. Bayley has produced the best line concerning this problem: "Community policing 
on the ground often seems less a program than a set of aspirations wrapped in a slogan." David H. 
Bayley, Community-Policing: A Report from the Devil's Advocate, in COMMUNITY 
POLICING: RHETORIC OR REALITY, supra note 3, at 225. 
18. See Maguire & Mastrofski, supra note 1. 
19. See, e.g., id 
20. Maguire and Mastrofski reviewed four surveys. One survey was produced by the Police 
Foundation, and the other three were implemented by the COPS office. For a description of the four 
surveys, see Maguire & Mastrofski, supra note 1, at 17, tbl.2. 
21. See id. at 25-27, tbl. 3. 
22. See id at 28, tbl.4. 
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50% participation in this activity.23 Because both COPS surveys were sent 
to organizations that applied for grants from the COPS office, and because 
the size of the COPS grants depends in part on the level of community- 
policing activities in which a needy local organization claims to engage, it 
is reasonable to conclude that reporting organizations might exaggerate the 
extent to which they were engaged in the kinds of community-policing ac- 
tivities the organizations believe the COPS office values.24 Thus, if the ac- 
tual rates of community engagement reported in the COPS survey is lower 
than 40% and 50%, respectively, then such rates, compared to the rates of 
community engagement reported by the Police Foundation survey, indicate 
wide disparity along an important community-policing yardstick. Such dis- 
parity makes it difficult to say anything meaningful about the kind of 
community policing local departments engage in. 
Of course even classification of various activities means little if there 
is no consensus around what community policing is. The task of defining 
community policing is made more difficult by the fact that there is no ex- 
isting history of the origins of community policing.25 It is fairly clear, how- 
ever, that community-policing strategies constitute a rejection of policing 
policies that became popular in the sixties and seventies emphasizing "'the 
three Rs': rapid response, random patrols, and reactive investigation."26 
Reform-era policing emerged in the sixties and seventies to combat 
police corruption by instituting polices to separate police officers from the 
influence of local politicians.27 The key ideas of so-called reform policing 
were rapid response, the technologies to implement rapid response, mobil- 
ity, and the professionalism of policing that attended these changes.28 
Because reformers saw local politics as the primary problem of policing, 
they sought to centralize control over individual police officers through 
hierarchical management structures.29 Additionally, reformers developed 
special units under central, rather than precinct, command, reasoning that 
professional expertise was the best way to address specific crime problems 
such as vice and drugs.30 (Note that vice typically includes gambling, pros- 
titution, pornography, and sometimes drugs, and is usually related to 
23. See id at 29, tbl.5. 
24. See id. at 19. 
25. See id at 15 ("A well-documented analysis of the origins and development of community 
policing has not yet been written."). 
26. WILLIAM BRATTON WITH PETER KNOBLER, TURNAROUND: How AMERICA'S TOP COP 
REVERSED THE CRIME EPIDEMIC 81 (1998). 
27. See George L. Kelling & Mark H. Moore, The Evolving Strategy of Policing, 4 PERSP. ON 
POLICING 10-11 (1988). 
28. See SPARROW ET AL., supra note 11, at 34-40 (describing aspects of reform-era policing); 
Kelling & Moore, supra note 27, at 9-18 (discussing rapid response, random patrol, and a "professional 
model" of policing). 
29. See SPARROW ET AL., supra note 11, at 118-23. 
30. Kelling & Moore, supra note 27, at 12. 
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organized crime.) Finally, the reform of organizational structure changed 
the way citizens interacted with police. The emergency-response number, 
or 911, became the primary mechanism for police engagement with citi- 
zens, leading to impersonal contacts between police and private citizens 
and the potential alienation of citizens from those law enforcers dedicated 
to crime control.31 
Community policing, regardless of its specific scholarly definition, 
stands in contrast to reform policing.32 Community policing in its various 
incarnations embraces the decentralization of command and celebrates the 
discretion of street-level officers, especially when they deal with commu- 
nity-nominated problems.33 Maguire and his colleagues describe commu- 
nity policing as a label comprising three interrelated forces that have 
shaped law enforcement over the past three decades.34 One force is a polic- 
ing approach called "problem solving," which gained prominence follow- 
ing a breakthrough 1979 article by Herman Goldstein.35 Goldstein 
articulated the idea that policing could be improved by focusing proac- 
tively on specific neighborhood problems, in contrast to the dominant re- 
form notion that the police's role was to respond to citizen calls for 
action.36 The second force is the decades-long interest in involving com- 
munities in law-enforcement efforts37-police need the support and assis- 
tance of private citizens. Since the late sixties, involving communities in 
policing has become a priority, as documents like the 1967 President's 
Commission on Crime attest.38 The third force, organizational adaptation, 
has been elegantly described by David Bayley, a scholar of police- 
organization management. Bayley asserts that police organizational struc- 
tures have evolved to implement the specific practices required by the in- 
terrelationship between forces one and two.39 The combination of 
31. See Reiss, supra note 1, at 92. 
32. See Moore, supra note 11, at 123 ("The fundamental idea behind community policing... is 
that effective working partnerships between police and the community can play an important role in 
reducing crime and promoting security.... Community policing also seeks to make policing more 
responsive to neighborhood concerns."). 
33. See id at 123; Debra Livingston, Brutality in Blue: Community, Authority, and the Elusive 
Promise of Police Reform, 92 MICH L. REV. 1556, 1572 (1994) (noting that Community policing 
implies "that officers are to have much greater freedom and to exercise independence") (citations 
omitted). 
34. See Edward R. Maguire et al., Measuring Community Policing at the Agency Level, 8, 11-13 
(1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
35. See Herman Goldstein, Improving Policing: A Problem-Oriented Approach, 25 CRIME & 
DELINQ. 236 (1979). 
36. See id. 
37. See Maguire, supra note 34, at 8-10. 
38. See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE 
OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 99-101 (1967). 
39. See DAVID H. BAYLEY, POLICE FOR THE FUTURE (1994) (reviewing police practices and 
organizational structures in several countries and detailing the kinds of organizational changes 
necessary to implement effective crime prevention strategies). 
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substantive practice with organizational change produces what is com- 
monly referred to as community policing. 
Identifying the three key forces that shape community policing tells us 
much about the kinds of activities police officers ought to undertake in or- 
der to pursue community-policing goals. The following Part presents a so- 
ciological theory that is consistent with the apparent turn in policing from 
disengagement to increased interaction with private citizens. This theory 
provides a framework for understanding both how the state could adopt 
practices that support community efforts to resist and reduce crime, and 
how those efforts could potentially lead to greater police legitimacy. 
II 
CRIME AND COMMUNITY PERSPECTIVES 
In communities that demonstrate the capacity to get things done, two 
dimensions, one structural and the other normative, work together. The 
structural dimension is captured by measures of community social organi- 
zation, while the normative dimension is captured by measures of collec- 
tive efficacy. These two dimensions are species of social capital. Both 
statistical and ethnographic models help to evaluate and track changes in 
social capital and the relationship of crime to community social processes. 
I begin by describing the problem of neighborhood crime as a 
community-based issue. Because crimes are committed by individuals, of- 
ten against individual victims, it is tempting to analyze crime on an indi- 
vidual basis, and to enact policies that address crime one person at a time 
through charging, convicting, and incarcerating individual offenders. Tak- 
ing this perspective, one might conclude that to reduce crime, one must 
focus on the individuals that commit crimes. In contrast, a community- 
based perspective on crime might lead to policy solutions that do not target 
individual offenders at all. Such strategies might promote third-party ef- 
forts to reduce opportunities for offenders to offend or motivate potential 
offenders to voluntarily abide by the law. 
A. Community Social Organization 
To understand what potential policies might look like, it is necessary 
to understand just what it means to adopt a community-based perspective 
about crime. Clifford R. Shaw and Henry D. McKay pioneered the study 
of such problems at the community level.40 Seeking to explain earlier find- 
ings that juvenile delinquency remained high in certain areas of central cit- 
ies over time despite population turnover, they rejected individualistic 
40. See CLIFFORD R. SHAW AND HENRY D. McKAY, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND URBAN 
AREAS: A STUDY OF RATES OF DELINQUENCY IN RELATION TO DIFFERENTIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF 
LOCAL COMMUNITIES IN AMERICAN CITIES (rev. ed. 1969). 
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explanations of delinquency.41 Instead, they looked to the processes by 
which lawbreaking behavior could be transmitted across generations.42 
They maintained that three structural factors-low economic status, ethnic 
heterogeneity, and residential mobility-led to the disruption of commu- 
nity social organization that, in turn, accounted for variation in crime and 
delinquency rates in a given area.43 Key to understanding Shaw and 
McKay's theory is that their hypothesis depends on the direct relationship 
between community social processes and crime in contrast to hypotheses 
that posit direct relationships between factors such as community poverty 
and crime. For example, Shaw and McKay theorized that residential mobil- 
ity in poor neighborhoods disrupted a community's network of social rela- 
tions, making it difficult for that community to establish norms of crime 
control.44 Similarly, Shaw and McKay believed that racial and ethnic het- 
erogeneity in neighborhoods thwarted the ability of poor community resi- 
dents to achieve consensus, thereby fueling fear and mistrust of one 
another. Clearly, fear and mistrust among neighborhood residents makes it 
difficult for residents to cooperate at the community level to exert social 
control over unruly youth.45 
Because Shaw and McKay believed that the capacity of a community 
to maintain social control was a function of the structural context of that 
community, they looked to the community itself, not the individual, as 
the explanatory unit for crime rates in urban areas. This was a path- 
breaking finding at the time, since Shaw and McKay's contemporaries be- 
lieved that associations between concentrations of African Americans and 
41. They noted: 
It is clear from the data included in this volume that there is a direct relationship 
between conditions existing in local communities of American cities and differential rates of 
delinquents and criminals.... Delinquency-particularly group deliquency, which 
constitutes a preponderance of all officially recorded offenses committed by boys and young 
men-has its roots in the dynamic life of the community. 
Id. at 315. 
42. See id at 174, 316-21. 
43. Shaw and McKay found that the relationship between structural community factors and 
delinquency was substantial. They found a correlation of .89 between delinquency rates in Chicago 
community areas and a proxy measure for poverty-the number of families on relief. See id. at 146-47. 
They found a correlation of .60 between delinquency and population heterogeneity (percentage of 
foreign-born and Negro heads of families). See id. at 152-55. Generally speaking, a correlation above .8 
is considered indicative of a strong positive relationship, and a correlation between .5 and .8 is 
considered indicative of a moderately positive relationship. Thus, both of these correlations are 
meaningful. See LAWRENCE C. HAMILTON, MODERN DATA ANALYSIS: A FIRST COURSE IN APPLIED 
STATISTICS 481 tbl.14.5 (1990). 
44. See SHAW & MCKAY, supra note 40, ch. 16. See also RUTH R. KORNHAUSER, SOCIAL 
SOURCES OF DELINQUENCY: AN APPRAISAL OF ANALYTIC MODELS (1978) 63-64 (explaining that, 
according to Shaw and McKay's theory, residential mobility leads to social disorganization through 
institutional disruption.) 
45. See SHAW AND MCKAY, supra note 40 at 184-85; KORNHAUSER, supra note 44, at 64-65. 
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the foreign-born and crime in urban areas were due to the individual dispo- 
sitions of group members, including genetic explanations for offending.46 
Though Shaw and McKay's theory to explain social problems in 
communities was ignored for quite some time, it has, in the last fifteen 
years or so, made a comeback. Contemporary researchers have extended 
Shaw and McKay's work by solidifying the notion of community charac- 
teristics as distinct from the aggregated emographic characteristics of in- 
dividuals who live in communities.47 For example, researchers have 
demonstrated in several studies that violence is associated with poverty and 
residential instability in neighborhoods, establishing the connection be- 
tween violence and neighborhood composition as opposed to the spatial 
distribution of individuals with particular demographic haracteristics.48 
Additionally, researchers have recently made inroads to defining those 
characteristics that best enable social control and the realization of the 
common values of residents-community social organization.49 In describ- 
ing the continuous nature of community social organization, theorists have 
focused on three processes: (1) the prevalence, strength, and interdepend- 
ence of social networks; (2) the extent of collective supervision by 
neighborhood residents and the level of personal responsibility they as- 
sume for addressing neighborhood problems; and (3) the rate of resident 
participation in voluntary and formal organizations.50 Their hypothesis is 
straightforward: when the processes of community social organization are 
prevalent and strong, crime and delinquency should be less prevalent, and 
vice versa. 
46. See ROBERT J. BURSIK, JR. & HAROLD G. GRASMICK, NEIGHBORHOODS AND CRIME: THE 
DIMENSIONS OF EFFECTIVE COMMUNITY CONTROL 25-27 (1993) (explaining scholarly disagreement 
over Shaw and McKay's findings when they were published and alternative explanations for high crime 
rates in urban areas). 
47. The research is "ecological" rather than "psychological." A fundamental assumption of 
ecological research is that social systems exhibit structural properties that can be examined apart from 
the personal characteristics of their members. See BRIAN J.L. BERRY & JOHN D. KASARDA, 
CONTEMPORARY URBAN ECOLOGY 13 (1977). 
48. See, e.g., Douglas S. Massey, Getting Away with Murder: Segregation and Violent Crime in 
Urban America, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1203 (1995) (describing how race and class segregation 
concentrates violent crime in poor, minority neighborhoods); Robert J. Sampson & Janet Lauritsen, 
Violent Victimization and Offending: Individual-, Situational-, and Community-Level Risk Factors, in 
3 UNDERSTANDING AND PREVENTING VIOLENCE: SOCIAL INFLUENCES 1, 48-63 (Albert J. Reiss & 
Jeffrey A. Roth eds., 1994) (summarizing the recent work applying social-ecological theory to 
explanations of the variation of criminal violence). 
49. See WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS: THE WORLD OF THE NEW URBAN 
POOR 20-21 (1997) (defining community social organization this way); Robert J. Sampson & W. Byron 
Groves, Community Structure and Crime: Testing Social Disorganization Theory, 94 AM. J. Soc. 774, 
777-82 (1989) (same). 
50. See, e.g., WILSON, supra note 49, at 20 (offering these three characteristics); Robert J. 
Sampson & William Julius Wilson, Toward a Theory of Race, Crime and Urban Inequality, in CRIME 
AND INEQUALITY 45 (John Hagan & Ruth D. Peterson eds., 1995) (same). 
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These community social organization processes, however, do not have 
to be activated in favor of norms that support law-abiding behavior; they 
are simply infrastructure. The metaphor of "norm highways" helps to clar- 
ify the fact that the social infrastructure of a community by itself can either 
inhibit or support crime."' Whether infrastructure supports a community's 
efforts to resist crime will depend on the kinds of norms transmitted among 
individuals who live in a neighborhood. Like autos on an actual highway, 
norms can travel in any direction on "roads" of neighborhood social infra- 
structure. Thus, the "norm highways" of neighborhoods may facilitate 
crime as well as prevent it. 
Sociologist Mary Patillo-McCoy has established empirical support for 
the notion that tight social networks sometimes support criminal conduct 
on a community-wise basis. In researching a Black middle-class commu- 
nity in Chicago, Patillo-McCoy found that dense social ties "positively 
affect[ed] informal and formal supervision of youth.... 
But... Groveland's dense networks similarly allow for organized criminal 
enterprises."52 This finding suggests that an important normative aspect of 
effective communities must be considered; social processes alone may 
simply represent untapped potential to get things done. Ideally, communi- 
ties exhibiting strong ties, high levels of organizational participation, and 
high levels of teen supervision also will be committed to the activation of 
these resources for the good of the community. 
B. Collective Efficacy 
Researchers in the Project on Human Development in Chicago 
Neighborhoods ("PHDCN") have developed a concept to capture norma- 
tive dimensions of community efforts to resist crime. The PHDCN re- 
searchers coined a term-"collective efficacy"--defined as the ability of 
neighborhoods to realize the common goals of residents and maintain ef- 
fective social control.5 They found, through multilevel statistical analy- 
ses,54 that the collective-efficacy measure is negatively associated with 
perceived violence, violent victimization, and homicide rates net of 
Chicago neighborhood-level predictors of crime such as concentrated dis- 
advantage, immigrant concentration, and residential stability.55 In fact, 
PHDCN researchers found that when collective efficacy was accounted for 
51. See Tracey L. Meares, Norms, Legitimacy and Law Enforcement, 79 OR. L. REV. 391, 395 
(2000); Tracey L. Meares, Place and Crime, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 669 (1998). 
52. MARY PATILLO-MCCOY, BLACK PICKET FENCES: PRIVILEGE AND PERIL AMONG THE BLACK 
MIDDLE CLASS 70 (1999). 
53. See Robert J. Sampson et al., Neighborhoods and Violent Crime: A Multilevel Study of 
Collective Efficacy, 277 SCIENCE 918, 918-19 (Aug. 15, 1997). 
54. The analytic model accounted for variation among individuals, variation within 
neighborhoods, and variation between neighborhoods. See id at 920. 
55. See id at 921-23. 
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in their model, the coefficients for concentrated disadvantage and residen- 
tial stability became statistically insignificant,56 which suggests that collec- 
tive efficacy plays a powerful mediating role between neighborhood 
composition and crime. Because the results of the PHDCN study described 
so far are cross-sectional, researchers devised a test to assess the relation- 
ship between collective efficacy and current crime in light of the prior 
crime rate. This connection is a critical one because in neighborhoods with 
high crime rates, residents may be unwilling to engage in acts of social 
control, which in turn will increase crime.57 Researchers found, after re- 
estimating the statistical models with a three-year average homicide rate, 
that collective efficacy remained statistically significant and substantially 
negative in all three models.58 
To measure collective efficacy, the PHDCN researchers utilized par- 
ticularly innovative methods. Survey respondents were not asked about 
their own practices and opinions; instead, they were asked to assess what 
happened in their neighborhood. Specifically, researchers tapped into resi- 
dents' assessments of neighborhood networks and practices, the extent to 
which people in the neighborhood shared the same values and the extent to 
which they trusted one another.59 In this way, community characteristics 
were mapped, paving the way for true ecological research. 
C. Building Social Capital 
James Coleman has described the concept of social capital this 
way: "Social capital... comes about through changes in the relations 
among persons that facilitate action. ... Just as physical capital and human 
capital facilitate productive activity; social capital does as well."60 Accord- 
ing to Coleman, social capital is realized through relationships.61 In an 
56. See id at 922. 
57. See id. 
58. See id. 
59. PHDCN researchers measured practices of informal social control through a five-item Likert- 
type scale. Residents were asked about the likelihood that their neighbors could be counted on to 
intervene if: (1) children were skipping school and hanging out on a street corner; (2) children were 
spray-painting graffiti on a local building; (3) children were showing disrespect to an adult; (4) a 
fight broke out in front of their house; and (5) the fire station closest to their home was threatened 
with budget cuts. 
To measure indicia of neighborhood social cohesion and trust, PHDCN researchers asked 
respondents how strongly they agreed that with respect to their neighborhood: (1) people are willing 
to help their neighbors; (2) it is close-knit; (3) people can be trusted; (4) people generally do not get 
along with each other; and (5) people do not share the same values. 
The two measures of informal social control and social cohesion were then combined into one 
measure-collective efficacy. 
60. James S. Coleman, Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital, 94 AM. J. Soc. S95, 
S100-01 (1988) (introducing and defining the concept of social capital). Coleman noted that "a group 
within which there is extensive trustworthiness and extensive trust is able to accomplish much more 
than a comparable group without that trustworthiness." Id. at Si11. 
61. See JAMES S. COLEMAN, FOUNDATION OF SOCIAL THEORY 304 (1990). 
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attempt to bring more clarity to the sometimes amorphous idea of social 
capital, Robert J. Sampson, Jeffrey D. Morenoff, and Felton Earls distin- 
guish the structural dimension of social capital from the normative one.62 In 
their view, community structural characteristics such as friendship net- 
works and participation in community organizations are potential resources 
that a community might utilize.63 In contrast, a community-wide norm of 
adult supervision of neighborhood children for the purpose of social con- 
trol is a positive goal-directed task that "activates" the resource potential 
found in friendship networks.64 
To see how community structural and normative social capital dimen- 
sions work together, consider the social-process dimensions already dis- 
cussed. When adults in a community inculcate a community expectation 
that each will supervise the community's children collectively, then in- 
creased supervision of teenage peer groups should follow.65 A community- 
wide expectation of youth supervision will not be meaningful unless sub- 
stantial numbers of the adults in a community believe that they are obliged 
to meet it. Therefore, a community of people must encourage adults to en- 
gage in beneficial community-wide supervision of children-perhaps by 
threatening social sanction for the failure to do so.66 In order for such a 
threat to be credible, however, there must be connections, or social net- 
works, among adults in a community to enforce the norms of community 
supervision of youths. Without networks connecting adults, any adult in 
the community can easily free ride on the contributions of his or her 
neighbors. All of this means that local friendship networks should reinforce 
adult supervision of teenage peer groups, which in turn could lead to lower 
levels of both victimization and offending.67 
Friendship networks might also create another form of social capital 
by facilitating information transmission between residents of a commu- 
nity.68 Information channels may be especially important to residents of 
crime-prone neighborhoods in urban centers. Urbanization is almost syn- 
onymous with densely populated communities, and population density can 
be a barrier to social-capital formation among city dwellers. The problem 
for many city dwellers is not so much that they have fewer acquaintances 
62. See Robert J. Sampson et al., Beyond Social Capital: Spatial Dynamics of Collective Efficacy 
for Children, 64 AM. Soc. REV. 633, 633-36 (1999) 
63. See id at 635. 
64. See id 
65. See Coleman, supra note 60, at S 102-03 (pointing to mutuality of obligation as an example of 
social capital); see also Sampson et al., supra note 62, at 647 (presenting a statistical model suggesting 
that neighborhood residents are more actively involved in child supervision when others are as well). 
66. See COLEMAN, supra note 61, at 244-45 (explaining the relationship between the emergence 
of a norm and sanctions). 
67. See, e.g., Sampson & Groves, supra note 49, at 788-89 (demonstrating that supervision of 
teenage peer groups is associated with lower crime rates). 
68. See Coleman, supra note 60, at S 104. 
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or weaker friendship networks than non-city dwellers; rather, the problem 
is one of proportion. The networks that a city dweller creates typically have 
less potential to include all of the individuals in a community with whom a 
resident comes into contact. Put simply, high population density increases 
the number of strangers. Friendship networks make it easier for residents to 
identify who "belongs" and who does not. 
Participation in formal organizations is another community structural 
factor that theoretically should reinforce the crime-reduction benefits of 
both teenage supervision and friendship networks. Local formal organiza- 
tions such as church groups, PTAs, community-policing organizations, and 
the like provide community residents with important opportunities to create 
overlapping relationships. Overlapping relationships subject the residents 
of a community to expectations and obligations in multiple contexts, and 
these expectations and obligations often are transferable across different 
contexts. The existence of multiple, overlapping relationships among a 
community's residents has important implications for crime prevention.69 
Friendships among neighbors that are reinforced through individual par- 
ticipation in local formal organizations are very likely to increase adult su- 
pervision of teenage peer groups and facilitate information transmission. 
Professors Robert Sampson and W. Byron Groves have studied the 
relationship between the components of community social organization 
surveyed here (levels of teenage peer group supervision, prevalence of 
friendship networks, and participation in formal organizations) and crime 
using British Crime Surveys in 1982 and 1984.70 Their work bolsters the 
theoretical projections made above. Specifically, their study finds that 
a measure of unsupervised teenage peer groups in the 1992 British Crime 
Survey had the independent effect of all variables in the regression equa- 
tion on three types of victimization measured in the survey: mugging or 
street robbery, stranger violence, and total victimization.71 Additionally, 
unsupervised teen groups had the largest independent effect on self- 
reported personal violence offending rates in 1982.72 Local friendship net- 
works were substantially and negatively related to robbery, and organiza- 
tional participation had significant inverse effects on both robbery and 
69. See id. at S 108-09 (explaining the concept of appropriable social organization); Marvin D. 
Krohn, The Web of Conformity: A Network Approach to the Explanation of Delinquent Behavior, 33 
Soc. PROB. S81, S83 (1986) (calling this process "multiplexity" and explaining that "if a person 
interacts with the same people in differing social contexts it is likely that his behavior in one context 
will be affected by his behavior in another"). 
70. For a description of the data and methodology used in the study, see Sampson & Groves, 
supra note 49, at 782-86. Note that the analysis in this piece potentially suffers from the ecological 
fallacy problem described above in note 47, as it attempts to characterize community-based processes 
through aggregated individual-level data rather than through more direct measures of community 
characteristics. 
71. See id. at 788-89, tbl.3. 
72. See id. at 792-93, tbl. 5. 
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stranger violence.73 While the magnitude of the effect of formal- 
organization participation was not as large as the effect of peer-group su- 
pervision and friendship networks on stranger violence and total crime vic- 
timization, the direction of the effect clearly supported earlier theoretical 
predictions.74 Perhaps most importantly, the study found that the effects on 
crime of the community-organization factors tested were much larger than 
the direct effect of socioeconomic status on crime.75 
More recent empirical work refines the relationships between a com- 
munity's social capital and crime reduction. Utilizing PHDCN data, which 
measures community characteristics in a more sophisticated fashion than 
do the British Crime Surveys, Jeffrey D. Morenoff, Robert J. Sampson, and 
Stephen W. Raudenbush demonstrated empirically that friendship net- 
works, neighborhood organizations, and participation in voluntary associa- 
tions appear to reduce violence through the promotion of collective 
efficacy.76 The authors statistically disentangled the independent effects on 
homicide of structural dimensions of social capital, such as social ties, and 
the normative dimensions of social capital, such as collective efficacy. In 
essence, the authors find that dense networks alone are neither necessary 
nor sufficient to explain homicide rates; instead, networks appear to create 
the capacity for neighborhood residents to exert social control.7 In keeping 
with this idea, the statistical models the authors present show that social 
networks are positively and significantly associated with collective effi- 
cacy.78 Similarly, the models show that organizations and voluntary asso- 
ciations appear to impact homicide indirectly by fostering collective 
efficacy.79 
D. Ethnographic Studies 
Statistical associations alone fail to explain the relationship between 
crime and community social processes. However, recent ethnographic 
work supports the quantitative studies explored thus far. While scholars 
can theorize about what lies behind statistical estimates, additional qualita- 
tive evidence is needed to confirm inferences. Qualitative research pro- 
vides a context for understanding and interpreting regression analyses. 
73. See id. 
74. See id. 
75. See id. at 789. The authors argue that the indicator of unsupervised teens mediates 80% of the 
total effect of community socioeconomic status on mugging and street-robbery victimization. 
76. See Jeffrey D. Morenoff et al., Neighborhood Inequality, Collective Efficacy, and the Spatial 
Dynamics of Urban Violence, 39 CRIMINOLOGY 517 (2001). 
77. See id at 548-49 fig.4. 
78. See id. at 550. 
79. See id. Compare Ruth D. Peterson et al., Disadvantage and Neighborhood Violent 
Crime: Do Local Institutions Matter?, 37 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 31 (2000) (finding that recreation 
centers, but not libraries or retail establishments, have a crime-reducing impact in extremely 
disadvantaged areas). 
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In two ethnographic works, Elijah Anderson compellingly recounts 
how the weakening of the structural fabric of an urban community called 
"Northton" accompanied the transmission of two different sets of norms 
among residents of the community." Anderson describes in great detail 
the clash between "decent" values (norms associated with hard work, fam- 
ily life, the church, and law-abiding behavior) held by some families in 
Northton and "streetwise" values (norms associated with drug culture, un- 
employment, little family responsibility, and crime) held by others. A cen- 
tral theme in Anderson's story is the gradual breakdown of a community 
tradition involving the transmission of decent values by neighborhood "old 
heads" to neighborhood youngsters." This breakdown accompanied the 
constriction of employment opportunities for the young, increased 
neighborhood transience, and increased crime.82 
Anderson's ethnography of Northton reflects the predictions of social- 
organization theory. As social networks in Northton weakened and con- 
tracted due to residential instability, unemployment, and increased drug 
use, a rival set of streetwise values flourished.83 The streetwise norms that 
Anderson describes are at once a product of affirmative reinforcement of 
lifestyles that focus on drug use and crime and the vacuum created by the 
breakdown of broad social networks. For example, when work in the for- 
mal labor market is not available for significant numbers of a community's 
residents, a value system among the jobless may affirm the pursuit of eco- 
nomic opportunities outside of the formal labor market and in the informal 
labor market, or even in the illegal drug economy.84 Furthermore, when 
social networks in a community are weak and disparate, it becomes more 
difficult for the community as a whole to emphasize the importance of 
seeking work in the formal labor market. 
Anderson's finding that streetwise values did not completely overtake 
decent values in Northton illustrates the functioning of collective efficacy 
in a community. While many in Northton continued to adhere to decent 
80. See ELIJAH ANDERSON, STREETWISE: RACE, CLASS, AND CHANGE IN AN URBAN 
COMMUNITY (1990) [hereinafter ANDERSON, STREETWISE] (describing the impact of wider economic 
changes on the African American community in Northton and introducing the notions of "decent" and 
"street" orientations); ELIJAH ANDERSON, CODE OF THE STREET: DECENCY VIOLENCE AND THE 
MORAL LIFE OF THE INNER CITY 35-65 (1999) [hereinafter ANDERSON, CODE] (describing "decent" and 
"street" families). 
81. See ANDERSON, STREETWISE, supra note 80, at 69-76; ANDERSON, CODE, supra note 80, at 
204-05. 
82. See ANDERSON, STREETWISE, supra note 80, at chs.2 & 3 (describing the relationship 
between economic changes in the Northton community and the attendant vulnerability of the 
community to crime-especially drug offenses). 
83. See id. 
84. See WILSON, supra note 49, at 66-72 (explaining that in communities in which joblessness is 
prevalent, residents may internalize modes of behavior that are inconsistent with preference for work in 
the formal labor market, which is characterized by greater regularity in hours and more consistent work 
than informal and illegal labor markets). 
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values, they still confronted streetwise values in their daily lives since 
those values predominated among the youth in the community.85 Of course, 
with competing value systems in a community, it is harder to establish a 
common value set, especially one directed toward affirmative collective 
efforts to resist crime as opposed to norms that support withdrawal from 
public life. The problem is magnified when the competition takes on a gen- 
erational aspect. 
For example, promotion of a community-wide norm of supervision of 
teenage peer groups is likely to be more effective when the level of social 
capital among adults exceeds that among teens in the community. Unfortu- 
nately, when the social capital among teens is high, which often is true in 
the communities containing street gangs,86 individual parents face a di- 
lemma. If parents cannot count on each other to supervise each other's 
children, then individual parents must counteract the norms developed by 
groups of teens-norms that may promote lawbreaking behavior. Each 
parent alone has little power to counteract the power of the teen group. 
Moreover, the power of the teen group may make the individual parent's 
task more intimidating, causing her to exert even less supervisory control 
than she otherwise would. This is, of course, a very general description of 
some of the mechanisms that underlie the withdrawal of Northton's "old 
heads" from community life."7 
In her new book, Black Picket Fences, Mary Patillo-McCoy's descrip- 
tion of "Groveland," a Black middle-class Chicago community, stands 
in stark contrast to Anderson's description of Northton. Patillo-McCoy 
85. See ANDERSON, CODE, supra note 80, at 98-106 (explaining how "decent" kids are impelled 
to "code-switch" and adopt "street" personas in public). 
86. The social-capital differential between teens and adults in the poorest urban communities may 
be driven in large part by numbers. For example, Chicago Housing Authority ("CHA") data collected 
in August of 1991 indicate that the ratio of individuals 15 years old and older to those 14 and under 
living in the Robert Taylor Homes and Stateway Gardens, two large contiguous CHA projects, was 
0.946. See THE CHICAGO Hous. AUTH., CHICAGO HOUSING AUTHORITY STATISTICAL PROFILE (1992). 
A tabulation of 1990 census data indicates that the poorest census tract in the United States in 1991 
contained Stateway Gardens. The same study indicates that the Robert Taylor Homes were located in 
one of the ten poorest census tracts in the United States. See Flynn McRoberts & Terry Wilson, CHA 
Has 9 of 10 Poorest Areas in U.S. Study Says, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 26, 1995, at 1. For a point of 
comparison, consider this same ratio for the Black middle-class community of Chatham. See Patrick 
Reardon, Profile: Chatham Chicago, CHI. TRIB. June 7, 1998, available at http:// 
yacgi.chicagotribune.com/homes/redirect.cgi. (describing Chatham as Black middle-class enclave). 
According to 1990 census data, the ratio of individuals 15 years old and older to those 14 and under 
living in Chatham was 5.14 (For data underlying this calculation, see CHICAGO CMTY. AREA 
DEMOGRAPHICS, at http://www.cagis.uic.edu/demographics/demographicsintro.html.). Thus, it is not 
surprising that adult social capital at Robert Taylor Homes and Stateway Gardens, where there are more 
children than adults, is exceeded by youth social capital, while adult social capital in Chatham, where 
there are five adults for every child, is significantly greater than social capital among youth. 
87. For a quantitative demonstration of the dynamics described here, see Sampson et al., supra 
note 62, at 656-57 (finding that residents of disadvantaged neighborhoods have much lower 
expectations for shared intervention on behalf of children in public settings even where the level of 
personal ties is not affected by concentrated disadvantage in neighborhoods). 
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provides a rich account of the multiple ways that Groveland's residents 
exert social control over youth. For example, she recounts a local 
school's council meeting in which one attendee stated, "We have to take 
responsibility for all of our children. The same children that are beating up 
on our children are also our children. They go right around the comer when 
they go home. They are our children."88 This statement captures the ex- 
pression of collective efficacy through a particular institutional process: a 
school council meeting. 
Patillo-McCoy goes on to describe how participants at community 
meetings of block clubs, police beats, church groups, and the chamber 
of commerce, among others, devote a great deal of time to the issue of 
youth supervision.89 Gangs and "gang-bangers" are the top concerns of 
Groveland residents.90 Strategies such as removing pay phones from the 
street, removing gang graffiti from buildings, hiring police monitors for 
playgrounds, and providing activities for at-risk youth are employed by the 
citizens in their effort to address gang issues.91 Patillo-McCoy's description 
provides real-life examples of the processes that Sampson and his col- 
leagues describe through statistics. Yet, Patillo-McCoy also demonstrates 
how strong social networks can also support "corporatized" gang activity.92 
Patillo-McCoy explains that Chicago's largest street gang, the "Black 
Mobsters," had a strong presence in Groveland and dominated parts of the 
neighborhood,93 but she describes how the top "Black Mobster," Lance, is 
fully integrated into the community.94 Lance makes sure that Groveland is 
clean because of his self-interest in protecting his family and due to the 
numerous activities of residents described above. Lance is an agent of so- 
cial control in the neighborhood, and the residents know it. Patillo- 
McCoy's ethnography demonstrates that in the midst of seemingly effec- 
tive community social organization, those involved in serious crime can 
peacefully coexist alongside those who abhor crime. 
This review of the sociological literature affirms that crime is a com- 
munity problem that can usefully be addressed from a community-based 
perspective. The existing research suggests numerous policy paths. For 
example, paying particular attention to criminal-law policy, I have ex- 
plained elsewhere how certain policing strategies could have potentially 
88. See PATILLO-MCCOY, supra note 52, at 78. 
89. See id. at 79-82. 
90. See id at 80. 
91. See id. at 79-82. 
92. See Jeffrey A. Fagan, Gangs, Drugs, and Neighborhood Change, in GANGS IN AMERICA 39, 
43 (Ronald C. Huff ed., 2d ed. 1996) (describing "corporate gangs" as those gangs with elaborate 
cohesive leadership structures that exist to make money and mimic business and group dynamics). 
93. See PATILLO-MCCOY, supra note 52, at 83, 85. 
94. See id. at 85-90. 
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positive effects on community social organization.95 However, this Part 
began by asserting that it is possible to imagine policy directed at third par- 
ties, instead of offenders, designed to help a community resist or reduce the 
crime in its midst. Given the theory outlined above, it should be clear that 
the police, or the state more generally, likely can promote community so- 
cial organization more directly than policies for reverse sting operations or 
ordinances on anti-gang loitering. While law-enforcement policies such as 
reverse stings and anti-gang loitering ordinances may result in improved 
collective efficacy, such a result would be indirect. Given the description 
of the processes necessary to build a community's capacity to get things 
done, we might imagine government programs that are more directly in the 
business of creating linkages among individuals in a neighborhood, or in- 
volving individuals in community institutions. We might even imagine 
programs involving individuals in organizations and bringing together 
community organizations and institutions that typically have little to do 
with one another for the purpose of helping children and addressing crime. 
Such programs involve rethinking relatively traditional approaches to law 
enforcement in terms of social-organization improvement. 
Creating connections among institutions that traditionally have had 
little contact creates the potential for social capital. If those connections are 
created around a particular goal, such as improved neighborhood safety, 
the research on collective efficacy reviewed above suggests that the struc- 
tural relationships can be activated in support of community efforts to re- 
duce and resist crime. The question, then, becomes how the state generally, 
or the police specifically, could bring community institutions together in 
ways that build a community's capacity for crime reduction. The next Part 
describes a quite surprising method that has taken place in Chicago- 
police-supported community-wide prayer vigils. 
III 
THE CHICAGO PRAYER VIGILS 
If a person is asked what she thinks of as community policing, that 
person might say, "Police officers walking a beat." Another person asked 
the same question might say, "Police officers who focus on garbage and 
graffiti clean-up in the neighborhood." Yet another asked the question 
might say, "Police sponsorship of a midnight basketball league." On 
Chicago's west side, I suspect that someone asked the question might say, 
"Community policing takes place when cops and residents pray together." 
That person likely would be referring to a series of community-wide 
prayer vigils beginning in 1997 in some of the most disadvantaged and 
95. See Tracey L. Meares, Social Organization and Law Enforcement, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
191, at 217-27 (explaining how reverse drug-sting and antigang-loitering ordinances could support 
community social organization). 
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high-crime neighborhoods in Chicago. The first was held in May 1997 on 
Chicago's impoverished west side as a community-wide prayer vigil to end 
violence against children.96 The structure of the vigil was somewhat 
unique. The participants stood in groups of ten on designated corners-the 
same corners where lookouts often hawked contraband by calling out 
"Rocks and Blows!"-and prayed for peace in the community.97 Following 
the prayer vigil, the group was joined by thousands of other community 
residents who went to a large park for a "praise celebration," which in- 
cluded music from a 400-member gospel choir, food, and inspirational 
speeches.98 While the size of the event made it unique, the number of peo- 
ple participating in the day-long activities was not its most remarkable fea- 
ture. What was remarkable about the vigil was that its key instigator was 
the police commander of the Harrison District, Claudell Ervin. 
The commander's involvement in the WSC prayer vigil followed a 
vision he had received approximately six months before the event. In his 
vision, Commander Ervin saw community residents standing in groups of 
ten on street corners: 
The Lord blessed me in such a mighty way when he gave me 
visions of ten people on the corner. I could never understand why 
ten people. The word says where two or three are gathered, I'm in 
their midst. Why ten? But then on prayer vigil day, I see why ten. 
Ten makes a statement on that corner. Two, three people, well, you 
know, what you all doing? You all really ain't doing nothing. But 
ten folks on the comer covers the whole corner. You got to go 
around them.99 
Acting on the vision, Commander Ervin sent out letters to hundreds of 
churches in the Harrison Police District containing an invitation to church 
96. The vigil covered an approximately 15-square-mile area bordered on the North, Ashland, 
Cicero, and Austin Avenues. For media accounts of the day's events, see Gary Marx, Cop Believes 
West Side Has a Prayer: Harrison Commander Uniting Thousands for Vigil Against Violence, CHI. 
TRIB. May 2, 1997, at 1; Dave Newbart, Residents Take Faith to the Streets for Vigil: Participants 
Pray for West Side Peace, CHI. TRIB. May 4, 1997, at 1. 
97. As I did not attend the first vigil, detailed information about it was gleaned through 
numerous interviews with participants and key organizers. Initial interviews with key vigil participants 
were conducted on May 22, 1997, June 11, 1997, and June 12, 1997. Following these initial interviews 
we constructed a list of potential interviewees by reviewing sign-in sheets from the planning-and- 
evaluation meeting for the first prayer vigil. Additionally, we distributed fliers in local churches and 
asked interviewees about others who might be interested in talking with us. Finally, we offered nominal 
monetary compensation ($10) for those who agreed to an interview. Fifty-five interviews were 
conducted between 1997 and 1998. Forty-one of these were with individuals who represent institutions. 
All interviews were conducted after promises of confidentiality according to human-subject research 
regulations at the University of Chicago, so their names will not be revealed in this Essay. My 
description of the 1997 WSC prayer vigil is taken from these interviews. 
98. See id 
99. Interview with Commander Claudell Ervin, Police Commander of the Harrison District, 
Chicago Police Dept., in Chicago, Ill. (May 22, 1997). 
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leaders to attend a meeting at the police district headquarters.°10 The invita- 
tion itself was not at all unusual. Community policing in Chicago was 
premised in part upon outreach to key neighborhood leaders,10' and 
churches are central to disadvantaged African American communities.102 In 
fact, interviews with key participants and institutional representative re- 
vealed that Ervin's immediate predecessor, Commander Bolling, also had 
tried outreach to church leaders in the district. Bolling's efforts, however, 
proved to be unfruitful. While Bolling had attempted to involve area 
church leaders by inviting them to meetings in area Baptist churches, 
Commander Ervin's strategy was different. Ervin invited the pastors from 
various denominations to attend a meeting at police headquarters rather 
than at their home churches, and he signed the invitation letter with an Old 
Testament scripture. Only pastors of the host churches showed up to the 
meetings organized by Bolling. In contrast, large numbers of pastors turned 
out for Ervin's meetings at police headquarters. It was during these meet- 
ings at the Harrison Police District Headquarters that the police and the 
pastors collaborated to plan a prayer vigil. 
A. The WSC Prayer Vigil as an Example of a State-Supported 
Social Organization 
The church-police collaboration that occurred in several west-side 
communities in Chicago103 beginning in 1997 presented such a poignant 
example of state-supported community social organization that it prompted 
a study. Data was collected over two years to assess the impact of two 
community-wide prayer vigils facilitated by the police.104 The goal of the 
100. See id 
101. See SKOGAN & HARTNETT, supra note 1, at 145-46 (explaining that churches constituted a 
"separate analytic focus" given that churches were key in several of the prototype districts). 
102. See C. ERIC LINCOLN & LAWRENCE H. MAMIYA, THE BLACK CHURCH IN THE AFRICAN- 
AMERICAN EXPERIENCE (1990). 
103. The WSC is comprised of seven local Chicago Community areas either in whole or in 
part: West Garfield Park, East Garfield Park, Austin, Humboldt Park, West Town, Near West Side, and 
North Lawndale. According to 2000 Census Data, the 11th District accounts for 2.8% of the total 
population of Chicago and ranks 19th among the 25 districts in terms of population. See 1999/2000 
CHICAGO POLICE DEP'T BIENNIAL REP. (2001). In 1997, there were 69 more murders in the 11th 
district than any other district in the City. See 1997 CHICAGO POLICE DEP'T ANN. REP. 16 (1998). The 
same was true in 1998, 1999, and 2000. See 1998 CHICAGO POLICE DEP'T ANN. REP. 10 (1999) (noting 
that in 1998 the 11 Ith district had 71 murders, 10.1% of the City's total); 1999/2000 CHICAGO POLICE 
DEP'T BIENNIAL REP. 12-13 (2001) (noting that in 1999 the 11th district had 79 murders, 12.3% of the 
City's total, and that in 2000 the 11 th district had 67 murders, 10.6% of the City's total). 
104. We collected data through five instruments administered between 1997 and 1999. The five 
instruments can be grouped into four different categories: (1) Two mail surveys administered in 1997 
after the first prayer vigil and in 1998 after the second attempted to gauge the level of institutional 
participation and the impact on institutional linkages because of the vigils; (2) A survey of the 
population of police officers in the Harrison district; (3) a randomized phone survey of 506 
respondents from the WSC area; (4) 55 open-ended interviews (14 individual-level and 41 
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research was to explore whether the potential benefits of the theories of 
social organization and collective efficacy could be realized on the ground. 
The study design was constructed keeping in mind that improved relations 
between churches and the police can assist residents of neighborhoods con- 
cerned about crime in three related, yet structurally different, ways. The 
first structural path concerns the vertical relationship between the police 
and the church.105 The second structural path emphasizes improvements 
that flow from tighter and more prevalent horizontal relationships among 
key community institutions.106 The third path involves the individual rela- 
tionships that neighborhood residents have with one another.'"1 This analy- 
sis reflects an application of Albert Hunter's three-level schema of social 
control.108 
1. Hunter's Three-Level Schema of Social Control 
Hunter asserts that community social control occurs at three lev- 
els: private, parochial, and public.109 The private level is the most basic. 
The private level of social order is comprised of an individual's family and 
friends, those with whom the person is closely connected. Social control is 
achieved informally through mechanisms such as support and mutual es- 
teem at one end, and ridicule, criticism, and even ostracism at the other.10 
The next level of social order is the parochial."' Individuals at this level, 
while connected, do not have the same sentimental attachments that are 
found at the private level.112 As a result, there is a much greater likelihood 
for the formation of important so-called weak ties at the parochial than at 
the private level.113 Hunter points to the public level as the final level of 
social control. The public level is comprised of resources external to the 
community, such as bureaucratic agencies like the police and other 
institutional-level) designed to obtain first-person descriptions of the WSC, to probe attitudes toward 
the community, relevant institutions, and the prayer vigil, and to get a sense of the vigil's impact. 
105. See infra text accompanying notes 114-17. 
106. See infra text accompanying notes 111-13. 
107. See infra text accompanying notes 109-10. 
108. See Albert Hunter, Private, Parochial and Public Social Orders: The Problem of Crime and 
Incivility in Urban Communities, in THE CHALLENGE OF SOCIAL CONTROL: CITIZENSHIP AND 
INSTITUTION BUILDING IN MODERN SOCIETY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF MORRIS JANOWITZ 230 (Gerald 
D. Suttles & Mayer N. Zald eds., 1985). 
109. See id. 
110. See id. at 232-33. 
111. See id. at 233-34. 
112. See id. at 234. 
113. These ties are "weak" because the relationship between two people weakly tied is less intense 
than the relationship between close family and friends. Mark Granovetter, who wrote the classic article 
on the topic, has shown, however, that such "weak ties" may be critical for job searchers. See Mark S. 
Granovetter, The Strength of Weak Ties, 78 AM. J. Soc. 1360, 1369-73 (1973); see also ROBERT D. 
PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY 319-21 (2000) 
(emphasizing the economic value of weak ties, which may be more likely to lead to job opportunities 
for those whose strongest ties are within economically disadvantaged communities). 
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instrumentalities of government.114 The major difference between this level 
and the other two is that the public level of social control relies uniquely on 
its legitimate monopoly on coercion and force to produce order. Hunter 
describes the criminal-justice system as the "ultimate" source of social 
control."' 
The public level can legitimately use force to produce order; however, 
this force alone cannot produce society's desired level of social control 
because of resource limitations and other formal constraints, such as 
constitutional law."16 Social control at the public level is produced through 
formal sanctions-the threat or actual imposition of coercion; therefore, 
compliance at this level is produced through instrumental means. 
Instrumental means of producing compliance depend upon an individual's 
fear of sanctions to produce an effect."7 If one assumes that people will 
comply with rules only with the threat of coercion, then instrumental 
methods of social control depend upon the commitment to increasing the 
use of force if necessary. This means that instrumental means of producing 
compliance can be costly. For example, if deterrence is produced by main- 
taining a certain probability of detection of rule breakers, then authorities 
must be willing to devote resources to maintain or increase the level of po- 
lice to ensure meeting the requisite probability of detection. 
In contrast to social control produced at the public level, and given the 
limitations of formal social control, social control produced at the private 
and parochial levels is produced through informal means and, therefore, is 
more likely to utilize normative rather than instrumental methods of com- 
pliance. Individuals voluntarily conform to the expectations of others by 
internalizing community norms."8 In some situations, the compliance pro- 
duced through the intermeshing of the private and parochial levels of social 
order looks much like compliance produced by the instrumental means at 
the public level-sometimes people comply because they fear informal 
sanctions imposed externally."' However, the individual who complies for 
normative reasons does so because she feels an internal obligation to do 
SO.120 
Social networks harness personal knowledge and trust among family, 
friends, and neighbors to create internalized expectations of obligation to 
conform to social norms.'12 Thus, it should be easy to see how Hunter's 
schema compliments the theories of social organization and collective 
114. See Hunter, supra note 108, at 238-39. 
115. See id. at 238. 
116. See id. at 238-39. 
117. See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 21 (1990). 
118. See id. at 24-26. 
119. See id. at 24, 59. 
120. See id at 24. 
121. See supra text accompanying notes 60-79 (section on social-capital building). 
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efficacy. While those theories help to explain how neighborhood residents 
resist crime through informal means without always resorting to the police 
and other criminal-justice entities, Hunter's three-level schema explains the 
relationship between a community's informal and formal efforts to produce 
safety. 
2. The Application of Hunter's Schema to the Analysis of the WSC Vigil 
Drawing on Hunter's schema, we can see how improved relations be- 
tween the police at the public level of social control and churches at the 
parochial level might benefit neighborhoods plagued by crime. Newly 
formed connections between churches and the police on the west side of 
Chicago could produce a new species of social capital to be directed to- 
ward violence control. For example, by interacting with church leaders and 
parishioners, the police likely would gain access to new sources of infor- 
mation to assist them in criminal investigations. Such interactions might 
make church leaders and parishioners more willing to identify offenders 
who victimize them, which in turn would allow the police to locate offend- 
ers more efficiently.122 If more offenders are located and arrested, then the 
certainty of punishment increases and so does the level of formal deter- 
rence. Church leaders, on the other hand, could parlay a stronger relation- 
ship with the police into better access to municipal-government resources. 
Perhaps even more interesting than the benefits on the vertical plane 
that flow from better relationships between churches and police are the 
stronger connections among the churches themselves. The WSC data show 
that church leaders rarely had frequent contact with leaders outside their 
denomination.123 One reason for this is simple competition among the de- 
nominations for congregants who can contribute to the collection plate.124 
The overwhelming majority of African American churches are denomina- 
tions in which the minister serves at the pleasure of his congregation.'25 
122. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STAT., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION IN THE 
UNITED STATES, 1999 STATISTICAL TABLES, tbl.103, Percent of Reasons for Not Reporting 
Victimizations to Police, By Race and Type of Crime (indicating that some victims do not report 
victimizations to police because they believe police to be uninterested, inefficient, or biased). 
123. The WSC mail survey reveals that while 65% of church leaders reported frequent contact 
with other church leaders within their denomination, only 35% reported frequent contact with leaders 
of the same religion but outside their denomination. Fewer still, about 18%, reported frequent contact 
with leaders from other faiths. 
124. For an interesting account of the relationship between disestablishment and the rise of and 
importance of competition among sects and individual churches, see Roger Finke, Religious 
Deregulation: Origins and Consequences, 32 J. OF CHURCH AND STATE 609 (1990). 
125. C. Eric Lincoln and Lawrence H. Mamiya document that in 1989, 38,800 churches were 
organized under the National Baptist Convention, USA, Inc., the National Baptist Convention of 
America, or the Progressive National Baptist Convention. See LINCOLN & MAMIYA, supra note 102 at 
31, 35, 37 (documenting the number of churches in the three denominations in 1989). This represents 
64% of the churches of traditionally African American denominations. African American Methodist 
(AME) and Pentocostal denominations make up the remainder. See id at 54, 58, 64, 84 (documenting 
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The communication barrier between church leaders from different sects is 
also fueled by distrust that flows from different faith-practice norms and 
liturgies. For example, I interviewed at least one Protestant minister 
who responded that he had had contact with church leaders of a different 
faith-Catholic priests.126 To that minister, the faith practice norms of 
Catholicism were different enough from his own such that he believed 
Catholicism and Protestantism to be different faiths despite the fact that 
both are Christian. 
Denominational cleavages are also supported by demographic differ- 
ences between sects. For example, in their landmark study of Black 
churches, C. Eric Lincoln and Lawrence H. Mamiya found that tradition- 
ally, Black Methodists tend to come from the middle-income bracket, 
while the majority of Pentecostal Church of God In Christ (COGIC) mem- 
bers are working class or working poor.'27 Baptist churches serve the larg- 
est chunk of churchgoing African Americans and reflect a diversity of 
social classes.128 A recent study indicates that African American Catholics 
have higher median incomes than individuals of any other typical African 
American religious affiliation, exceeding the median annual income of 
Baptists by almost $4,000.129 
Given these demographic differences, it should be obvious that church 
organizations of different sects serve different, but overlapping, parts of the 
WSC. It is also likely that organization leaders are located in various social 
networks and operate within different spheres of influence. Bringing these 
institutions together can have an important impact on the ability of a com- 
munity to assert social order. Collaboration between leaders of different 
groups would enable them to form "weak ties" with each other and would 
allow the individual leaders to access resources to help their congregations 
as well as to build a stronger base to influence the public level of social 
control.130 
the number of churches in three AME denominations and the number in the Church of God in Christ 
(COGIC) denomination). Lincoln and Mamiya note that Baptist ministers are not appointed to a church 
by a higher ecclesiastical authority. See id. at 42. Churches belonging to the COGIC denomination, 
while not as free-standing as Baptist churches, tend to exercise considerable autonomy. See id at 84- 
88. 
126. The historical antagonism between Catholics and some Protestants, especially evangelical 
Protestants, has a long history in the United States. See, e.g., ROBERT WUTHNOW, THE 
RESTRUCTURING OF AMERICAN RELIGION: SOCIETY AND FAITH SINCE WORLD WAR II 72-76 (1988). 
Note, however, I did not get the sense that the Protestant minister whom I interviewed held animus 
against Catholics; rather, he just had not worked with many Catholics. 
127. See LINCOLN & MAMIYA, supra note 102, at 172 (1990). 
128. See id. 
129. See BARRY A. KOSMIN & SEYMOUR P. LACHMAN, ONE NATION UNDER GOD: RELIGION IN 
CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN SOCIETY (1993). 
130. See Granovetter, supra note 113, at 1373-76 (noting that ties among different types of groups 
appeared to enable effective community organizing against a neighborhood threat). 
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Rather than analyzing the WSC prayer vigils,'31 I will focus next on 
the officers' beliefs about the events that took place. As I will show in Part 
IV, many officers who worked in the police district under Commander 
Ervin's supervision held positive beliefs about the WSC prayer vigil 
whether or not they participated in the vigil. Many of the officers in the 
Eleventh District believed that the prayer vigil benefited the communities 
in which they worked. Such a finding would appear to be good news for 
implementing the theories of community organization and collective 
efficacy on the ground. Those theories suggest that if communities are 
structured in certain ways and if the individuals in the communities have 
the inclination to take ownership of community problems that support 
crime, then crime can be resisted.132 If the state is going to play a role in 
supporting the community structure that improves a community's capacity 
to resist crime, then one would hope that the state actors who are helping to 
bring about structural change believe that their efforts are worthwhile. 
The data in the next section reveal a paradox, however. While many 
officers surveyed registered very positive opinions about the WSC prayer 
vigil and its impact, about half of those same officers registered opinions 
that are inconsistent with state-supported efforts to bring important com- 
munity institutions together in ways that could improve a community's 
capacity to resist crime. Instead, these officers implied that the task of fa- 
cilitating collaboration among the churches ought to be carried out in the 
officer's private capacity. For those who believe that the state should be 
involved in supporting community efforts in favor of informal social con- 
trol, this finding is problematic. The finding suggests that an important 
limit on implementing community-based crime resistance may be state 
actors' conceptions of themselves. 
IV 
ASSESSING THE OFFICERS' OPINIONS OF THE 1997 WSC PRAYER VIGIL 
Following the first WSC prayer vigil in 1997, 170 police officers 
in the Eleventh District were surveyed.'33 Researchers administered the 
131. I have another paper that analyzes the data to determine the social-organization impact of the 
WSC prayer vigils. See Tracey L. Meares, Churches, Communities and Crime (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with author). 
132. See supra text accompanying notes 40-79. 
133. The following is a summary of the respondents for the police survey: 28.2% worked the 
graveyard shift, 38.2% worked during the day, and 33.5% worked evenings. At the time of the survey, 
12.9% were sworn members of the CPD for 0-2 years, 27.6% for 2-5 years, 30.0% for 5-10 years, and 
25.9% for 10 or more years. With respect to the surveyed officers' rank, 84.1% were privates, 7.6% 
were sergeants, and 1.2% were lieutenants. The length of time assigned to the district varied 
considerably: 30.6% were assigned to the district for 0-2 years, 28.2% for 2-5 years, 25.9% for 5-10 
years, and 11.8% for 10 or more years. Finally, officers varied with respect to the distance they lived 
from the 11 th district: 7.1% lived within 0-2 miles of the 11 th district, 17.6% lived within 2-5 miles, 
and 71.8% lived 5 or more miles away from the 11 th district. 
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surveys during the officers' meetings and roll call at the beginning of each 
of the three shifts: "graveyard," day, and evening.134 The survey consisted 
of twenty-seven questions that asked the officers to indicate whether they 
strongly agreed, somewhat agreed, somewhat disagreed, strongly dis- 
agreed, or had no opinion about numerous statements. It was created using 
guidelines from prior community-policing research.'35 The researchers 
obtained a near 100% response rate from the officers surveyed due to the 
institutional support provided by Commander Ervin and his staff.'36 
As noted above, many people agree that creating closer relationships 
between police and community residents is a key aspect of community po- 
licing. Eleventh District officers were asked to evaluate two statements 
about the potential relationship between the prayer vigil and relationships 
between the police and community members: (1) "the prayer vigil made 
me feel better about the prospects for this community;" and (2) "the 
prayer vigil helped create a more personal relationship between the police 
and some residents in the community." The first statement is a measure of 
the officer's opinion regarding the potential outcome of a putative commu- 
nity-policing tool-the prayer vigil. The second statement is arguably a 
measure of the extent to which the vigil ought to be considered part of a 
community-policing program. 
The data reveal that a substantial minority of officers surveyed, about 
41%, either strongly agreed or somewhat agreed that the prayer vigil made 
them feel better about the prospects for the WSC in which the officer 
worked.137 Over half of the respondent police officers, 55.6%, either 
strongly agreed or somewhat agreed that the vigil created a more personal 
relationship between police and some community residents.'38 These per- 
centages are particularly interesting in light of the fact that only 14% of the 
respondents actually participated in the prayer vigil in some way. 
134. With the help of the shift lieutenants and Commander Ervin, researchers were introduced to 
the officers and explained the study. The surveys were then administered over a period of days, and the 
officers were guaranteed that their responses would be completely confidential. 
135. See Dennis P. ROSENBAUM ET AL., CTR. FOR URBAN AFFAIRS AND POL'Y RES., Nw. U., THE 
IMPACT OF COMMUNITY PREVENTION PROGRAMS IN CHICAGO: CAN NEIGHBORHOOD ORGANIZATIONS 
MAKE A DIFFERENCE?, in COMMUNITY CRIME PREVENTION PAPERS (1985). 
136. Chicago police officers are divided into furlough groups. For any given period of weeks, a 
certain number of furlough groups are inactive. Researchers chose survey periods that maximized the 
participation of the most furlough groups in the survey. Importantly, this survey was not administered 
to a sample, but to a population. A sample consists of an observed subset of the population; a 
population consists of the total set of relevant individuals. A necessary and important implication of 
this distinction is that a statistical analysis of a population is descriptive, not inferential. ALAN AGRESTI 
& BARBARA FINLAY, STATISTICAL METHODS FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 5-8 (Collier Macmillan, 2d 
ed., 1986). 
137. Another 41% of police officers surveyed offered no opinion about the first statement, and 
about 18% of surveyed officers disagreed with it. 
138. About 24% of respondents disagreed with this statement, and another 19% offered no 
opinion. 
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Eleventh District officers were also asked to assess their feelings 
about the following series of statements about the value of the prayer vigil 
as a policing tool: (1) "it is good for the CPD to be involved in organizing 
events like the prayer vigil;" (2) "the CPD should help the community to 
organize religiously oriented events like the prayer vigil;" (3) "the prayer 
vigil was a good investment of police time and resources;" and (4) "the 
prayer vigil is consistent with what I think Community Policing is 
supposed to be." The survey responses demonstrate that overall, a greater 
percentage of officers registered opinions in favor of, rather than against, 
the prayer vigil as a policing tool; however, the percentages are fairly close 
to one another in each case.139 
In order to tie the perceptions of officers to the theory of state- 
supported social organization explained above, it is useful to make some 
basic predictions about the relationship between officers' perceptions of 
the value of the prayer vigil as a tool and their assessment of its potential 
impact. For example, we might expect that the police officers who feel bet- 
ter about the community's prospects because of the prayer vigil also think 
that it is good for the CPD to be involved in organizing events like the 
prayer vigil. Similarly, we might expect the officers who feel better about 
the community's prospects after the vigil to also believe that the CPD 
should help the community to organize religiously oriented events like the 
prayer vigil. Moreover, we might even expect such officers to believe that 
the prayer vigil is consistent with their own conception of community po- 
licing. 
As Table 2 indicates, the officers' responses, by and large, are consis- 
tent with these expectations.'40 The vast majority of police officers who 
reported having more favorable expectations about the community's pros- 
pects after the prayer vigil also agreed with statements in support of the 
CPD's involvement in organizing similar events. 
These data would appear to be good news for those concerned about a 
lack of police support for innovative strategies that could lead to enhanced 
informal social control in neighborhoods with crime problems. As noted 
above, many scholars consider citizen input in the development and im- 
plementation of crime-prevention programs a necessary component of 
community policing.41' As Jerome Skolnick and David Bayley wrote, 
community policing involves police-citizen reciprocity, which means that 
police "genuinely feel, and genuinely communicate a feeling, that the 
public they are serving has something to contribute to the enterprise of 
139. See infra APPENDIX, tbl.1. 
140. See id., tbl.2. 
141. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
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policing."142 A recent survey by the Police Foundation found a high level 
of support among police officers for the proposition that the police should 
look to the public for advice and cooperation.143 If one assumes that com- 
munity members support police collaboration with religious institutions,144 
one would hope and expect that the police officers who are concerned 
about the community's prospects would be willing to utilize strategies that 
the community supported and that the officer himself or herself believed to 
be a good idea. 
Yet, the data reveal an interesting wrinkle in this respect. Respondent 
officers were asked whether the prayer vigil should be conducted by police 
officers on their own time rather than as an official police activity. We 
might expect police officers who indicated that organizing prayer vigils 
makes them feel better about the community's prospects, and who believe 
that police-facilitated prayer vigils are consistent with good policing, to 
disagree with the following statement: It is fine if police officers want to 
participate in prayer vigils on their own time, but it is not the CPD's job to 
organize and participate in them. 
Interestingly, the data do not consistently reveal this trend. Predicta- 
bly, those who responded that the prayer vigil did not make them feel bet- 
ter about the community's prospects thought that police officers who were 
interested in such activities ought to pursue them on their own time. Less 
predictably, about half of the officers who supported activities like the 
prayer vigil and who stated that the prayer vigil made them feel better 
about the prospects for the community also agreed that police interested in 
prayer vigils ought to engage in such activities on their own time. Table 3 
contains the data supporting this paradox.145 
These results are at least curious. If police officers do not think that a 
particular practice is consistent with their view of community policing, 
then it is not at all surprising that those officers believe that officers who 
are interested in such a practice ought to engage in that practice off duty. 
On the other hand, if we assume that one tenet of community policing is 
that police officers ought to be charged with carrying out practices that the 
community approves and supports in order to foster better relations be- 
tween police and community members, then it is reasonable to expect the 
officers to align themselves with the practices that the community 
142. JEROME K. SKOLNICK & DAVID H. BAYLEY, THE NEW BLUE LINE: POLICE INNOVATION IN 
Six AMERICAN CITIES 212 (1986). 
143. POLICE FOUND., THE ABUSE OF POLICE AUTHORITY: A NATIONAL STUDY OF POLICE 
OFFICERS' ATTITUDES 25 (2001) [hereinafter POLICE FOUND]. 
144. In the case of the WSC, there is reason to think that community members support the concept. 
We surveyed 500 adults randomly by phone in the WSC. When asked "Do you believe that cooperation 
between the police and the church is a good idea," 84% answered, "yes." 
145. See infra APPENDIX, tbl.3. Note that this paradox is consistent even when the question about 
the value of the prayer vigil is asked in different ways. See id., tbl.4. 
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approves. This is especially true when an officer herself thinks that the 
practice is beneficial. As noted above, the recent Police Foundation survey 
suggests, at least at the national level, that today's police officers believe 
that community partnership and cooperation are effective means of ad- 
dressing community crime problems.146 
As the next two Sections demonstrate, whether we can expect police 
officers to support programs like the WSC prayer vigil depends on at least 
two aspects of the police officer's conception of her role. One might think 
that a police officer ought to support activities such as the prayer vigil if 
that officer believes that they bring police closer to the community, given 
the material on community policing reviewed above. This police officer 
must support the underlying values of the community policing in the first 
place. As Part IV.A demonstrates, persuading officers to let go of the self- 
image that reform policing promotes has not been the easiest of tasks. 
To explain why those who object to CPD involvement with the WSC 
prayer vigil hold that belief, the values embodied in the First Amendment 
immediately come to mind. Yet, ideas about separation of church and state 
cannot be the only factors that explain the paradox in the attitudes of 
Eleventh District police officers. Consider one study designed to compare 
the attitude of elites to those of the general public concerning issues of 
church and state.'47 The study's authors conclude that there is a direct cor- 
relation between education and views about the separation of church and 
state. Compared to college graduates, respondents who had only a high- 
school diploma were much less likely to oppose government support of 
religious activity.'48 Respondents with some college education were more 
likely than those with only a high-school diploma to oppose government 
support of religious activity, but a majority of that group was in agreement 
with the position of government support for religious activity.149 Given that 
most police officers have not graduated from college,'50 one would not ex- 
pect strong ideas about the separation of church and state to motivate their 
opinions of the Chicago prayer vigils. In fact, the data support the opposite 
conclusion as the majority of respondents with only a high-school educa- 
tion or some college education agreed with the notion that government 
146. See POLICE FOUND., supra note 143. 
147. See TED G. JELEN & CLYDE WILCOX, PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD CHURCH AND STATE 
(1995). 
148. Id. at 67. 
149. Id. 
150. One 1988 study found that 87.4% of police officers did not have a baccalaureate. See Eugene 
A. Paoline, III, et al., Police Culture, Individualism, and Community Policing.: Evidence from Two 
Police Departments, Just. Q. 17, 583 (2000) (citing D.L. CARTER ET AL., THE STATE OF POLICE 
EDUCATION: POLICY DIRECTIONS FOR THE 2IsT CENTURY 38 (1989)). A 2001 study by the Police 
Foundation found that 66.9% of police officers did not have a baccalaureate degree. POLICE FOUND, 
supra note 143, at 11. 
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should support all religions.'51 Objection to state involvement in religious 
activity could explain the responses of the officers who believe that police 
officers who want to participate in prayer vigils ought to do so on their 
own time, but the objection does not explain fully the more nuanced posi- 
tion of officers who seemed to view the prayer vigils as a community- 
policing tool and who claimed that the CPD should not be involved in or- 
ganizing prayer vigils. Part IV.B takes up this issue. 
A. Community Policing and Ideal Police Work 
Research examining the level of support among police officers for 
community policing might as a general matter explain the paradox in the 
attitudes of the Eleventh District police officers. As Arthur J. Lurigio and 
Wesley G. Skogan have said, "[T]he transition to community policing is 
frequently a battle for the hearts and minds of police officers. Community 
policing requires .., officer[s] to attempt unfamiliar and challenging 
tasks,... and to reach out to elements of the community who were 
previously outside their purview."'52 Training for traditional, reform-era 
policing has emphasized basic law-enforcement activities such as weapon 
firing, patrol, investigation, arrest, and report writing.'" Such training 
helped to contribute to the "professionalization" of police.'54 In contrast to 
reform policing, community policing often requires police officers to shift 
their orientation from a focus on reactive activities that promote proactive 
approaches to identifying and addressing problems-ideally, in collabora- 
tion with citizens.•' Given the focus of traditional police training, one 
might expect police officers to resist community-policing activities; in- 
deed, researchers in Chicago found that CPD officers were ambivalent 
about community policing before it was implemented in prototype dis- 
tricts.156 
Police researchers have pointed out at least two reasons why police 
officers might resist the shift from reform policing to community policing. 
First, officers might resent having to perform tasks that they classify 
as "social work" rather than "real" police work.'57 Second, officers might 
151. See JELEN & WILCOX, supra note 147, at 67. 
152. Arthur J. Lurigio & Wesley G. Skogan, Winning the Hearts and Minds ofPolice Officers.: An 
Assessment of Staff Perceptions of Community Policing in Chicago, 40 CRIME & DELINQ. 315, 316 
(1994). 
153. See SAMUEL WALKER, THE POLICE IN AMERICA: AN INTRODUCTION 313-15 (3d ed. 1999). 
154. See id. at 35 (noting that the traditional agenda of "professionalization" included, among 
other factors, more police training). 
155. See, e.g., Lurigio & Skogan, supra note 152, at 318 (laying out the features of Chicago's 
community-policing program which freed beat officers from 911 calls, while emphasizing a more 
proactive police approach to crime problems). 
156. See id at 328-29. 
157. See, e.g., JEROME E. MCELROY ET AL., COMMUNITY POLICING: THE CPOP IN NEW YORK 34 
(1993) (quoting a police officer who said that police "[1]ike to see themselves as 'crime-fighters' even 
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view citizen participation as interfering with their autonomy and 
disregarding their expertise.'58 These aspects of police culture suggest that 
converting police officers to community police officers is no easy task. 
Organizing and participating in prayer vigils is not traditional police 
work. Rather than investigating crimes and arresting offenders, officers 
who were involved in the prayer vigil engaged in activities that to them, no 
doubt, looked very little like "police work." Moreover, rather than utilizing 
their crime-fighting expertise, the officers involved had to cede direction of 
the event to nonpolice citizens--church leaders. Given these departures 
from more typical "crime-fighting" work, the lack of support among some 
Eleventh District officers for CPD involvement in prayer vigils can be ex- 
plained by the factors to which scholars such as Skogan and Lurigio have 
looked in order to make sense of police resistance to community policing 
generally. 
When officers were asked whether, as a general matter, the CPD 
should be involved in helping the community to organize itself to fight 
crime, 91% percent of the officers surveyed either strongly agreed or 
somewhat agreed.159 This finding suggests that the Eleventh District CPD 
officers viewed community policing more positively than did the officers 
that Lurigio and Skogan surveyed in 1993.160 However, the fact that the 
vast majority of the Eleventh District CPD officers appear to support com- 
munity policing does not discount the reasons proposed by scholars to ex- 
plain resistance to community policing. This case should be considered a 
specific example of community policing. While 91% of the officers sur- 
veyed supported CPD involvement in community-organizing to fight 
crime, 34% of those did not believe it was a good idea for the CPD to 
be involved in organizing events like the prayer vigil.'6' It is possible to 
though they know they aren't really"); SKOGAN & HARTNETT, supra note 1, at 80 (quoting a police 
officer's statement: "I'm a police officer, not a social worker. I don't have time to sit and shoot the 
shit."). 
158. See, e.g., SKOGAN & HARTNETT, supra note 3, at 85 (describing officers' skepticism towards 
community policing due to potential infringement on police authority by citizens). 
159. This question was purposefully worded to emphasize the potential community-organizing 
aspect of community policing. It goes further than simply asking officers whether citizens should assist 
them or whether police should work with citizens. Instead, in using such broad language, it suggests the 
possibility of more independent action by private citizens to fight crime. 
160. See Lurigio & Skogan, supra note 152, at 326-28. 
161. See infra APPENDIX, tbl.5. Although most of the CPD officers surveyed appear to support 
community policing, we might expect the strength of that commitment to vary with demographic 
factors, especially when officers are asked about particular community-policing practices. For example, 
police researchers have demonstrated that there is a relationship between age, minority status, rank, and 
favorable attitudes towards community policing. See Lurigio & Skogan, supra note 152, at 327 
(demonstrating higher levels of endorsement for community-policing activities among older officers, 
minority officers, and high ranking officers, and showing that these same officers were more optimistic 
about the prospects for community policing to lead to change). While we were unable to collect data on 
race, we collected data on other demographic variables. A chi-squared (V) analysis of the cross 
tabulations of the officers' opinions regarding participation in activities such as the prayer vigil on 
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conclude that even those officers who support community policing find 
that police-supported prayer vigils cross the line of proper community po- 
licing. They might believe so because the prayer vigils too closely resem- 
ble social work and do not provide the officers with enough discretion to 
exercise their professional expertise. Or, police officers might believe that 
prayer vigils cross the line in another way, as the next Section explains. 
B. Community Policing and Internalized Constitutional Norms 
Even police officers who believe that the WSC prayer vigil is consis- 
tent with community policing and that the prayer vigil made them feel 
better about the prospects for the community might nonetheless conclude 
that it is better for police officers to be involved in community prayer vigils 
on their own time rather than the CPD's because of their commitment to 
another principle. The First Amendment's proscription of certain relation- 
ships between religion and government might be the most straightforward 
way to explain that a significant number of police officers simultaneously 
favor the prayer vigil and believe that it is not the CPD's role to be offi- 
cially involved in such events.162 While this statement may seem obvious, it 
is important to note that officers who reach this conclusion must reject at 
least one other factor that police officers typically value-their role as law- 
enforcement officers charged with preventing or reducing crime. 
Many view the police as crime fighters.'63 Police also view themselves 
in this way, and their view of themselves as expert professionals depends, 
in part, on presenting themselves as individuals uniquely devoted to pro- 
tecting the public.'64 Because a primary role of the police is to address 
crime, police officers may conceptualize themselves in ways that support 
their ability to combat crime. Moreover, it is also reasonable to expect po- 
lice officers to endorse activities that help them address crime. Therefore, 
we might expect officers who believed both that the prayer vigils made 
them feel better about the prospects for the community and that the vigils 
were a good use of police resources to also believe that it is appropriate for 
the CPD to support prayer vigils. These beliefs, considered together, are 
consistent with a professional identity in support of addressing crime.'65 
one's own time and the length of time as a sworn officer reveal no statistically significant associations 
among the variables. The / statistic measures the proximity of the observed frequencies to the 
expected frequencies for independent variables. The / significance test measures the likelihood that the 
observed association would occur if the variables were independent. AGRESTI & FINLEY, supra note 
136, at 211-12. 
162. The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states, "Congress shall make no law respecting 
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. .." U.S. CoNsT. amend. I. 
163. See WALKER, supra note 153, at 4. 
164. See id. at 5. 
165. Twenty-two officers held an opinion that could be characterized in this way. 
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The data presented here suggest that in addition to caring about serv- 
ing the public through addressing crime, some police officers also concep- 
tualize their roles in terms of appropriate public and private activities. The 
group that most clearly demonstrated an opinion that can be characterized 
in this way are the officers who believed that the prayer vigil made them 
feel better about the prospects for the community, but who nonetheless did 
not think it was a good idea for the CPD to be involved in organizing such 
events. These officers quite understandably stated that police officers who 
wanted to participate in prayer vigils ought to do so on their own time.166 
However, explaining the views of a different group of officers-those who 
claimed to feel better about the community's prospects after the vigil 
and who claimed that it was a good idea for the CPD to be involved in or- 
ganizing events like the prayer vigil, but who stated that it is better for offi- 
cers to engage in such activities on their own time--cannot be done in a 
straightforward manner.167 One must conclude that these officers, as a 
group, are profoundly ambivalent about their roles as agents of the com- 
munity and as representatives of the state who ought to be committed to 
constitutional values. I emphasize constitutional values because the officers 
were never asked explicitly whether they thought that CPD support of the 
WSC prayer vigil was unconstitutional or otherwise violated law or agency 
rules. Moreover, many Americans are untutored about the structure of gov- 
ernment and the constitutional principles of the First Amendment. Ted 
Jelen and Clyde Wilcox report that one-third of the respondents to their 
survey of attitudes toward church and state knew that freedom of religion 
was protected by the First Amendment.168 Still, they note that people have 
many opportunities through church services, parochial schools, media out- 
lets, and the like to develop coherent positions on church-state matters 
without explicitly tying them to constitutional interpretations.169 
The idea that the data support the interpretation that officers have in- 
ternalized First Amendment values without coming to an explicit conclu- 
sion about the constitutionality of the WSC prayer vigil fits with recent 
research on the "legal consciousness" of ordinary citizens. Laura Beth 
Nielsen explains that the study of legal consciousness focuses on how or- 
dinary citizens articulate their understandings of law and legality in every- 
day social life.170 Importantly, Nielsen also emphasizes that legal 
consciousness refers as much to how people do not think about the law 
as it does to what they do think about it.'71 In other words, legal 
166. Eight officers held an opinion that could be characterized inthis way. 
167. Twenty-nine officers held a position that could be characterized in this way. 
168. JELEN & WILcox, supra note 147, at 31. 
169. See id. 
170. See Laura Beth Nielsen, Situating Legal Consciousness: Experiences and Attitudes of 
Ordinary Citizens About Law and Street Harassment, 34 LAW. &. Soc'Y. REv. 1055, 1059 (2000). 
171. See id. 
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consciousness can be "the body of assumptions people have about the law 
that are simply taken for granted. These assumptions may be so much a 
part of an individual's worldview that they are difficult to articulate."172 
Thus, one way to explain why some police officers believed that the prayer 
vigil had a positive impact and was consistent with good policing, but that 
officers ought to be involved in such activities on their own time is that the 
opinion reflects a somewhat unarticulated consciousness about an appro- 
priate role for the state. Until the question was asked, it was not in the fore- 
front of the officers' minds. 
The potential inconsistency between constitutional norms and com- 
munity policing has been raised in other contexts. For example, David H. 
Bayley has warned that a shift from traditional reactive policing to prob- 
lem-solving and community policing could result in the erosion of consti- 
tutional rights through strategies that effectively encourage citizens to act 
as vigilantes."73 That is, because community policing is designed to make 
police officers more accountable to the desires of neighborhood residents, 
one might worry that community policing will provide majority popula- 
tions with a tool for oppressing minority populations.174 When one thinks 
about the ways in which greater interaction between police and private citi- 
zens could encroach on constitutional rights, it is natural to consider 
whether constitutional protections could be eroded by state actions at the 
request of the community."75 This danger cannot be denied even in the con- 
text of this Essay. Commander Ervin's goal was to promote greater in- 
volvement of WSC institutions into the everyday work of keeping streets 
safe. The theories of social organization and community-based social capi- 
tal reviewed above explain the potential crime-reduction and resistance 
value of the collaboration between the police and church-organization 
leaders in communities like the WSC. Yet, some scholars have criticized 
state-supported community efforts to resist crime in the inner city as insuf- 
ficiently attentive to individual criminal-procedural rights.'76 
However, while some scholars register concern that community polic- 
ing might lead to the constriction of individual constitutional rights, one 
172. Id. 
173. See Bayley, supra note 17, at 232. 
174. See id 
175. For example, in some respects, state actors--especially police-should internalize norms that 
set them apart from private individuals. Police should be able to tell community residents, "No we are 
NOT going to frisk every young man on the block because the Constitution requires us to have 
justificatory evidence before engaging in a search." 
176. For an explanation of the value of state-supported community efforts, see Tracey L. Meares 
& Dan M. Kahan, Law and (Norms of) Order in the Inner City, 32 LAW & Soc'v. REV. 805 (1998). For 
criticism of this approach, see Bernard E. Harcourt, After the "Social Meaning Turn ": Interpretive 
Theories and Methods of Proof in Contemporary Criminal Law Scholarship, 34 LAW & Soc'Y. REV. 
179 (2000); Dorothy E. Roberts, Race, Vagueness, and the Social Meaning of Order-Maintenance 
Policing, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 775 (1999). 
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benefit of the church-police collaboration was that it led to greater levels of 
accountability of the police to the residents of the WSC than existed prior 
to the vigil-a kind of accountability that could reduce incursion by police 
on the constitutional rights of the WSC residents. The accountability 
increased because after the WSC prayer vigil, Commander Ervin's 
relationship with the ministers was an important source of his legitimacy in 
the community."'77 Ervin depended upon their favor to develop the commu- 
nity's trust in him. Because the ministers held positions of trust within 
various neighborhoods of the WSC, their willingness to work with Com- 
mander Ervin in turn increased the community's trust in the police.178 
Therefore, it is not surprising that Commander Ervin valued his relation- 
ship with church leaders. 
The creation of social capital enabled a higher level of accountability 
of the police to the community, and it was a function of the particular ac- 
tivity described here-a community-wide prayer vigil facilitated by the 
police. Thus, while some officers may have objected to the CPD's support 
of the prayer vigil for reasons sounding in constitutional principle, it is im- 
portant to see that the role of the state-the police-in the prayer vigil 
helped to create a social structure that potentially prevented other en- 
croachments on individual rights by police officers. 
THE FUTURE OF COMMUNITY POLICING 
One central idea of the community-policing movement is that private 
citizens ought to partner with law-enforcement officers to produce higher 
levels of safety in communities. The community-policing movement re- 
jects the notion of police officers as professional crime fighters. Instead, 
ideal community-policing officers are flexible generalists willing to help 
community residents solve crime problems or other noncrime problems 
177. A story helps to illustrate this point. In the fall following the 1997 prayer vigil, a young 
minister came upon two CPD officers arresting a man in a WSC neighborhood. Although the arrestee 
was not one of the minister's congregants, the minister decided to intervene. The officers asked the 
minister to leave the arrest scene, which was unfolding peacefully, but the minister refused. The rest of 
the account is contested, but the minister ended up being arrested. When the minister was taken to the 
Eleventh District Headquarters to be processed for an arrest, Commander Ervin saw him but did not 
talk to him because Ervin was on his way out. When Ervin returned he was unable to speak to the 
minister because the minister had already invoked his right to remain silent and to speak to a lawyer. 
That evening, several of the church leaders who now worked together because of the prayer vigil held a 
press conference complaining about racial profiling in the WSC. Commander Ervin was extremely 
upset by the incident and undertook strenuous efforts to meet with the prayer vigil's church leaders in 
order to find a solution that would allow the group to work together again on the 1998 prayer vigil. 
178. The ministers functioned effectively as trust intermediaries. Compare Karen S. Cook & 
Russell Hardin, Norms of Cooperativeness and Networks of Trust, in SOCIAL NORMS 327, 338-40 
(Michael Hechter & Karl-Dieter Opp, eds. 2001) (explaining the centrality of guanxi, personal 
intermediaries who make introductions between members of previously unassociated groups, in 
Chinese business society). 
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that residents believe to lead to unsafe conditions in their neighborhoods.79 
As noted above, however, policing scholars have had a difficult time decid- 
ing exactly what kinds of activities constitute community policing. 
This Essay offers a theory of state-supported social-capital formation 
to explain how the WSC prayer vigil could be considered a particularly 
innovative example of community policing. According to the theories of 
community-based social-capital formation, it would appear that activities 
like the WSC prayer vigil may well enhance the capacity of the disadvan- 
taged neighborhoods that comprise the WSC to resist and reduce crime. 
Moreover, the nature of relationships formed between the churches and the 
police, and among the churches themselves as a result of the vigil, would 
appear to enhance the potential of WSC residents to better hold law- 
enforcement officers accountable. Through increased accountability, police 
are more likely to direct their energies to problems and issues that residents 
care about; moreover, increased accountability is likely to reduce the viola- 
tion by law-enforcement officials of individual rights pertaining to 
searches, seizures, and the like. 
All of this sounds quite positive, but the mechanism to achieve this 
state of affairs was quite unusual: a police-facilitated community-wide 
prayer vigil. One could reasonably fear that such an activity, while poten- 
tially advancing freedom from encroachment on say Fourth Amendment 
rights, might infringe on rights protected by the First Amendment. In fact, 
it would appear that some of the officers in the district where the vigil took 
place thought so. Others did not appear concerned. Still others appeared 
deeply conflicted. 
What should we make of this? There are no easy answers, but the data 
do raise some specific questions about the enterprise of community polic- 
ing. How important is it that police be psychologically committed to pro- 
jects that the community believe important? Does the answer to this 
question suggest that it is important for the project of community policing 
that law-enforcement officers share the cultural norms and background of 
the communities that they police? Does the shift from reform policing to 
community policing present too high a danger of compromise of constitu- 
tional rights? And finally, is it possible to imagine trade-offs of one consti- 
tutional right for another? Should we permit certain communities that 
historically have been denied adequate law-enforcement resources and ac- 
cess to the political arena to decide for themselves whether this trade-off is 
permissible? 
Answering these questions is a daunting intellectual agenda. My hope 
is that by providing a community-based perspective on crime, theories of 
179. See, e.g., SKOGAN & HARTNETT, supra note 1, at 165-93 (noting that citizens' complaints and 
calls for service from police ranged well beyond traditional complaints about crime to problems 
associated with sewers, potholes, abandoned buildings, and graffiti). 
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state support for community efforts to do something about crime, and some 
survey data on police opinions, I have provided food for thought for those 
interested in participating in the endeavor. 
APPENDIX 
TABLE I 
Yes No No Opinion 
Good for CPD to be involved 54.6% 34.4% 11.0% 
in organizing events like vigil (89) (56) (18) 
CPD should help organize 42.7% 47.0% 10.4% 
religiously oriented events (70) (77) (17) 
Prayer vigil was a good 48.8% 33.1% 18.1% 
investment of police time and 
resources (78) (53) (29) 
Prayer vigil is consistent with 43.9% 36.3% 19.7% 
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TABLE 4 
Own Time 
Agree Disagree No Opinion 
S Agree 47.1% 48.6% 4.3% 
o0 
= Disagree 89.6% 6.5% 3.9% 
. 
No Opinion 41.2% 11.8% 47.1% 
, 
Agree 55.1% 39.7% 5.1% 
oc~ 
>W-4 00 0 Disagree 86.8% 9.4% 3.8% 
5 
c. 
g No Opinion 58.6% 13.8% 27.6% 
Agree 47.8% 49.3% 2.9% 
> 
'0 
Disagree 91.2% 5.3% 3.5% 
0  0 No Opinion 61.3% 9.7% 29.0% 
TABLE 5 
Prayer Vigil is consistent with what I think 
community policing is supposed to be 
Agree Disagree No Opinion 
58.5% 34.0% 7.5% 
Agree 
(86) (50) (11) 
. 
Da14.3% 71.4% 14.3% 
S Disagree 
S(1) (5) (1) 
I 12.5% 12.5% 75% 
. 
o No Opinion 
ULuo (1) (1) (6) 
